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3 
 Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To associate populism with the new radical right political movements is an accepted habit 
in Europe. However, a new concern is related to the fact that this late anti-globalisation form 
of populism is no longer confined to a sort of small voting district of the far right groups. As a 
matter of fact, the populist’s dissatisfaction with mainstream politics and the perception of a 
disordered internationalisation – e.g. uncontrolled mass migration, absence of delimited 
national borders - is reaching to large segments of the middle class electorate. That being said, 
it would be the best option to relate the trend of neo-populism with an open, non-specific 
appeal to protest citizens, to the so-called Modernisierungsverlierer
1
, or people who have lost 
out in the modernisation process. 
 
The purpose of this research is to offer a contribution to the study of the growth of anti-
establishment political groups in the UK, specifically, the United Kingdom Independence 
Party (henceforth UKIP), a typically perceived right-wing political movement whose main 
belief is the separation of the UK from the European Union. Founded in 1991 by Alan Sked as 
an anti-EU single-issue party and as an organisation for disgruntled Conservatives, the party 
has become controversial lately due to an increase in popularity against mainstream politics, 
and a large amount of media attention given to its leader Nigel Farage. 
 
The present dissertation is divided into six chapters for my reader’s perusal, each of them 
dedicated to a specific aspect concerning national populism and the discursive construction of 
 
 
1 https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-531-92496-0_5 
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 UKIP’s communication, mainly set up under the aegis of its longest leader Farage. The first 
chapter presents a theoretical approach, socio-political in the first instance and linguistic 
afterwards, through a critical literature review in order to settle a methodological framework. 
The second section consists of a report concerning Brexit, Euroscepticism and societal 
changes associated to the phenomenon, with a literature review orientated in this connection. 
 
The third chapter will discuss the theoretical framework and methodology, anchored on a 
completely qualitative interpretation and presenting how the case study was conducted, as 
well as the rationale behind it. The methodology section is focused on a Critical Discourse 
Analysis approach and its interdisciplinarity. Critical Discourse Analysis (henceforth CDA), 
especially designed to investigate the construction of political conflict in times of crisis, 
(Wodak et al. 1999, 2009; Van Dijk, 2001; Cap 2013 and the proximization theory) has been 
adopted to deconstruct UKIP lexical representation of the rival players on the battlefield, the 
British people against the European Union. Moreover, discourse in this context combines 
varied patterns including approaches from sociology, political sciences, linguistic and classic 
rhetoric for a kind of analysis approaching texts as part of a social interaction process 
(Fairclough 1989: 24). CDA focuses on language as a social practice in the framework of 
social, cultural and political perspectives, thus emphasizing the great importance of the 
connection between textual structure in a social context and society. 
 
A fourth brief section deals with the genres that were selected for analysis, the way the 
whole corpus is organised, its composition and the time span under investigation according to 
the explanatory tables reported. The fifth section explores the texts and debates the findings in 
order to answer the research questions and verify the hypotheses. Therefore, the elements of 
the analysis under scrutiny consist of constructive strategies (the linguistic processes which 
authorise a national ‘we-group’ – in this case, Britons - and alienate the ‘other’ groups or sub-
groups ); continuation and justification strategies (economic migrants are viewed as a danger 
to the national security); forms of positive self-presentation coming 
5 
 upon through manifestos, public speeches and the British press (mainly tabloids), and multiple 
forms of negative other-presentation (e.g: the EU, Muslim migrants). 
 
The sixth and last chapter shows to what extent Farage and UKIP discourse could be 
defined as a discourse of uncertainty, ever-growing anxiety and well-judged ‘mild racism’, 
featuring a heavy Self–Other distinction and organised techniques of Othering. The 
construction relies on discursively created threat and fear generation devices, investigated 
thanks to the graft of the proximization theory approach and in order to detect how and when 
nat-populist language performs a coercive function. 
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 Chapter 1 
 
 
Populism: in search of a definition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1 Commonly-known Features about the Term “Populism” 
 
 
As explained in the introduction of this work, the earlier marginal right-wing populist 
UKIP has turned out to be the fastest growing political party in the country (Arak, 2013: 45). 
Therefore, the political group is not an overnight success anymore: people are disappointed by 
the conventional party policies, their incapacity to put a limit on immigration and to protect 
the disappearance of British identity. This support comes from the popular sectors of that part 
of the society made of those left behind, whose life is marked by labour and strive to make 
ends meet, those who are exploited by the establishment, the unexamined elites and even by 
organizations such as the parties and the “official” trade unions (Pasquino, 2005: 8). Thus, we 
have the stereotypical contraposition between the ‘pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, 
which “argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale of the people” 
(Mudde, 2004: 544). 
 
From a historical point of view, the fight for the political narrative has for long 
concentrated competition in the hands of the two main parties. Nevertheless, in this new 
multipolar socio-political perspective, the term “populist” still suffers a negative connotation. 
This reveals to be quite surprising considering the fact the term originates from the Latin word 
“populus”, a simple reference to people. A rhetorical populist speech is anyway 
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 commonly retained to address the emotional rather than the rational side of our minds, with 
the second considering fact-checking and the search for a compromise. 
 
 
 
 
1.2 Euroscepticism 
 
From the point of view of a populist/eurosceptic politician, Europe is seen as a bureaucratic 
system that encourages economic mismanagement with no prospect of long-term viability. 
That means the sooner the wealthy nations get out of the EU, the sooner the whole system 
crumbles, and the better that will be for everyone. According to the results obtained in the 
Brexit referendum, British people have held to be true that getting out of the EU could be the 
first step on the path to national renewal. 
 
Significant would be a distinction between two types of Euroscepticism, what Szczerbiak 
& Taggart (2000: 7) term ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ Euroscepticism, in order to find a definition that 
works in twenty-eight national contexts. In the light of the above, Soft Euroscepticism can 
only be said to exist in a significant way where a party employs the rhetoric of disagreement 
over the European issue as part of a broader political repertoire, but this is not the type of 
scepticism of interest for this case study. On the other hand, if we want to delineate the 
concept of “hard” Euroscepticism, it can be found where there is a moralistic opposition to the 
EU and European integration, and therefore it can be observed in political movements 
according to which their countries should retire their membership, or whose policies towards 
the EU are equivalent to being opposed to the whole project of European integration as it is 
currently conceived (Ultan & Ornek 2015: 50). 
 
There are two simplified methods of determining whether a party is ‘hard Eurosceptic’. 
The first way is to check if a party could be defined as a single anti-EU issue. We presume 
that a party would entirely be ready for action against the EU if it were hostile to it on 
principle. The second way is to ask whether the opposition to the EU is framed in language 
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 that underlines the supranational is too capitalist/socialist/neoliberal/bureaucratic; whether it 
depends on ideological stance (communist/conservative/socialist/populist); and whether it 
demands an indispensable renovation in order to call into question their country as an EU 
member, defined as unsuitable with the existing course of the European project. 
 
 
 
1.2.1 Euroscepticism Against the Integration Process 
 
 
The voters for Brexit were motivated by a series of reasons, among them concerns that 
echo across the European mainland: imaginative desires about the national past; unease with 
multiculturalism and changing social norms regarding gender equality and the LGBT dispute; 
and vague beliefs that a return to ‘nation’ will produce better outcomes than economic 
integration (not all populist movements anyway). Not to mention, within that, the regional 
discrepancies in people’s employment and wages, as they then feel united with bitterness 
against the ‘metropolitan elite’. These individuals are discontent with the mainstream party 
policies, their failure to block immigration and preserve from the disintegration of national 
unity and British identity. In other words, it seems to be a question of blood and soil. 
 
Among the features of a Eurosceptic Party it is considerable to put into the foreground 
some of them which will have important consequences for the European Union itself. 
 
The first element is the dispute between False vs. True Europeanism 
2
. From this point of 
view, the idea that a centralized authority, in our case the Political Union, is necessary for free 
trade and is seen by mainstream parties as mere reverie, and false Europeanism, for the reason 
that the European Union cannot stand, in the name of Europe, independent States not inclined 
to submit to Brussels. The second issue under scrutiny in this paragraph is ‘decentralization’. 
According to this definition, it has always been Britain that came to the aid of Europe to 
 
 
 
2 https://mises.org/library/european-union-anti-european 
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 interrupt up the power of empires on the continent in recent history. The question for 
Eurosceptic supporters was whether the UK would have played its historical role on June the 
23rd against the imperialistic European Union. The answer is yes, but only on paper for the 
moment. The third and last element worth mentioning is re-thinking the UK following a Post-
European scenario. What comes out in those first Brexit phases is that stricter entry rules will 
likely be applied to incomers. That means Britain is intent in building up barriers to lower-
skilled migrants while simplifying prerequisite for high-skilled arrivals from outside the EU. 
Indeed, this will provoke consequences hitting Eastern European migrants in particular, while 
encouraging North Americans citizens to work in Britain. 
 
 
 
 
1.3 Ethnic Pluralism 
 
 
«As far as the English are concerned, all of life’s greatest problems can be summed up in 
one word – foreigners». This sarcastic quotation from Antony Miall’s “The xenophobe’s 
guide to the English” (1999) could be the starting point for a key to the interpretation of cross-
cultural feature of ethnicist and nationalist patterns of perception of others. Usually, 
‘mudslingers’ define a Eurosceptic programme as a combination of anti-political 
establishment populism, with a quest to return to the status quo ante (including the importance 
to preserve the priority of national identity), and welfare chauvinist racism and xenophobia. In 
other words, these forms of political protest concern ethnos, rather than demos (Albertazzi & 
McDonnel, 2008: 16). So, Nouvelle Droite is to replace the old, biologically based concept of 
racism with the one of ‘ethno-pluralism’ that contributes to the foundation of the so-called 
‘new racism’ (Barker, 1981) or ‘cultural racism’ (Wieviorka, 1995: 32). 
 
Ethnopluralism is a new right European opinion on multiculturalism: the progressive 
notion of difference is the point of departure on which the philosophy of multiculturalism, 
based on the assumption that migrants should preserve their right to practise religions and 
10 
 traditions of their home countries, should be replaced in favour of a more reasonable 
‘ethnopluralism’ attitude in order “to preserve the unique national characters of different 
peoples, they have to be kept separated” (Rydgren, 2005: 427). Hence the notion is in contrast 
with left multiculturalism: it refers to the necessity to safeguard the right to cultural 
differences, highlighting the fact that the mixing of diverse ethnicities leads to cultural 
extinction. Extreme-right populist parties are frequently able to convey xenophobic and racist 
public opinions without being branded as racists. However opposed to the traditional idea of 
racism, the dogma of ethnopluralism is not hierarchical, since different ethnicities are not 
necessarily considered as superior or inferior to each other, only distinct and incompatible. 
The concept of ethnopluralism declares that in order to protect the unique national characters 
of different peoples, they have to be kept separated. 
 
Certainly, the debate is that the electorate is xenophobe, not the politicians, or the political 
and media communication they create. Established parties notice their voters being fascinated 
by radicals and populist far-right, which profitably encourage the concerns and uncertainty of 
honest working-class for political advantage. Philomena Essed has currently investigated this 
notion of “entitlement racism”3, consisting in actions adopted by politicians and media that 
are distinctly abusive and/or discrediting of minorities, but are exactly legitimized by right to 
“freedom of speech” and the necessity of public discussion. Following Rydgren (2003), these 
parties exploit four specific arguments: 1) immigrants represent a threat to the ethno-national 
identity, 2) immigrants constitute one of the causes for criminality or other kinds of social 
insecurity; 3) immigrants are a reason of unemployment; and 4) immigrants are nothing but 
profiteers who take advantage of a compassionate Welfare in Western democracies. This new 
form of racism described by Taguieff, for example, as “differentialist racism” (1990) (see the 
aforementioned cultural racism introduced by Wieviorka), underlines the irreconcilable 
 
 
3 Entitlement Racism: A Public lecture with Professor Philomena Essed & Professor Martin Parker, on 
the CBS PP Platform's cluster on Diversity and Differences, 19/04/2016.  
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 differences between ethnic groups culturally defined, which are in turn delineated in cultural 
terms without reference to explicitly racial criteria. Rydgren’s hypothesis is that the discourse 
on insecurity and national identity is functional for the ethnicization and racialization of social 
conflict. However, it would appear the language of UKIP is a language of both power and 
diversity, of hybridization between nationalist and populist ideas, a strong “pessimistic and 
reactionary force” (Goodwin & Milazzo, 2015: 221). 
 
 
 
1.4 Populism: a Contemporary Overview 
 
It is by now confirmed that in a fair number of political cultures and languages the 
definition of “populism” brings with itself negative rather than positive implications 
(Canovan, 2005; Andersson, 2009), despite the fact the history of the word, descending from 
the Latin noun “populus” that is the people, communicates an independent and/or legitimized 
connotation. In 1969, Wiles maintained the term was more proper to be defined as a syndrome 
and not a simple doctrine, in other words a response to different political groups and beliefs 
rather than an ideological baseline per se. Furthermore, the difficult task of determining what 
populism is has in part something to do with the fact this word has been employed for the 
definition of political leaders, groups, ideologies, movements throughout a multitude of 
ideological and historical backgrounds. As Arter expressed in 2010 (490), it is possible to 
notice a “general agreement in the comparative literature that populism is confrontational, 
chameleonic, culture-bound and context-dependent”. For what concerns Europe, since the 
1980s there has been the existence of a growing, restrictive alternative populism taking aim at 
immigration and national border controls (Mudde, 2007). 
 
However, the academic knowledge on populism is noticeably scarce and many scholars 
have surrendered on the possibility of employing the word in any significant manner. For 
example, in the European circumstances the term has been applied to portray anti-immigration 
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 and anti-EU parties like the French National Front (FN), the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) 
or, indeed, the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP). Part of the terminological 
disorientation stems from the fact that people and organisations marked as “populists” hardly 
recognize themselves as such. The term is alternatively attributed by others, most often as a 
precisely negative label. Moreover, the definition of populism is adopted with negative 
connotations in the European media to indicate such different events as a grassroots 
organisation, a careless economic plan, or a deceitful form of politics. Thus, populism adheres 
to the ranks of other ‘burdened’ terms in the social sciences that miss a generally approved 
interpretation. When talking about migration or refugees, for example, European populists 
reply with a common sense apology of the native people opposite to a demeaned out-group, 
that is to say immigrants. Crime and terrorism would be supplementary cases of how the 
populist politics of emotions opposes the establishment politics of facts. 
 
For a long period of time, right-wing fanaticism and populism were marginal phenomena 
of not more than 10% of the voters, but they have now moved from symptoms to alternatives 
and what is more, even in cases where it has been far isolated from actual power, have 
succeeded in influencing the political agenda resolutely, as the UKIP revealed during the 
Brexit vote. 
 
An increasing number of right-wing parties now jointly use the same design and contribute 
to a critique of the corrupt elite and praise of the ordinary people that constitute the nation. 
For instance, populist organisations throughout Europe have economised to an “Us first!” aura 
of nationalism clearly evident in their mottos, such is the case of Nigel Farage’s “we want our 
country back”. It should not be considered as a revelation that a flexible ideology like 
populism is absorbed by a variety of political groups wanting to use a disruptive rhetoric. 
Their diffusion, however, has been made caused by a stagnant economy and incessant 
migration emergency, but also by the capacity of populists to cultivate captivating strategies 
adequate to achieving large support. Consequently, we should maintain populism is the direct 
13 
 result of globalisation and its undesired repercussions: outsourcing of contract work, ruthless 
automation, unemployment and stagnant middle-class wages. 
 
It is important to stress, anyway, the fact that it is too common misconception to portray 
populist voters as simple losers of the modernisation process with an erroneous feeling of 
blame ascription. In fact, reasons alluding to austerity and salary distribution may explain 
animosity and discontent, but they need to be counterbalanced with the key function of 
ideology and an investigation of the desire of populist leaders to achieve power and modify 
social reality. This perspective implies that populist parties are not simple aftermaths of 
socioeconomic transformations, but they actively create their future. 
 
A real interesting note to point out when discussing populism is its message, which in part 
resonates for it is based on the democratic assurance of honouring the will of the people. That 
is why the anti-establishment message generates positive sentiments. Furthermore, a growing 
number of voters is disappointed with the system of capitalism and liberal democracy and has 
validated concerns such as social injustice, stagnation, uncontrolled migration, political 
distrust. This scenario paves the way to populists who take the chance to present themselves 
as the spokespersons for those left behind by the post-modern economy, and call for a direct 
legitimation from their connection with the ‘sovereign’ people. Populism also furnishes a 
moral storytelling in which the pure and the corrupt fight against each other. This moralistic 
idea of politics is extremely negative towards elites, who are defined morally inferior, and 
generous in relation to respectable common citizens. Besides this anti-elitist attitude, their 
nativist conservatism implies a renationalisation of politics which disputes the project of a 
European political union. By adopting nationalist claims as leverage, populists have acquired 
support in different European nations, also because of an intrinsic crisis being externally fed, 
that is to say by the menace of Salafi jihadism and a non-stop flood of migrants and refugees. 
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 1.5 The Elite vs. The People 
 
 
According to the recent political results in the Western World, it seems that modern 
establishment is affected by a “political malaise”. Moreover, people’s profound dissatisfaction 
with ruling elites represents a fruitful ground for populism coming to light. Populism parties 
try to install democracy in people, and in a manner they are challenging contemporary 
representative democracy in western societies. Some scholars relate the emergence of 
populism with the signal that some democratic regimes are not working correctly. This is a 
sign of alert about deficiencies, limits and vulnerability of a representative system. Meny and 
Surel (Meny & Surel, 2002, Ch.2), among the political factors which have an impact on this 
phenomenon, mention: the crisis of the structures for what concerns a political intermediation; 
the “customisation” of political power and increasing role of media in political life. Among 
the elements that contributed to this “State” of crisis, we can mention the weakening in party 
membership as first consequence, lack of interest and suspicion in politics and politicians, 
raising number of uncommitted and let down voters ready to radical alternatives ( for 
example, extreme right-parties), have to be considered as symptoms of this “democratic 
disease”. On the contrary, some kind of media in this situation are no help, for the way in 
which they present facts and opinions generates even more anti-political atmosphere and 
encourages to popularization of populism parties (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008: 1). Those 
parties assume that a traditional intermediary institution should be removed and replaced by a 
direct connection between government and electorate (Decker, 2003: 50). Not surprisingly, 
the doubt has been instilled that populism arises in crisis of intermediate institutions, when 
ordinary citizens are compelled to adapt to a severe new situation where unemployment, 
weakness, uncertainty are everyday reality, and where identity crisis and social exclusion are 
spreading (Gilly, 2005: 38). Probably, some countries were or still are giving rise to the 
feelings of insecurity, fear and desolation among Europeans. This situation has been exploited 
15 
 by populist parties which pledge popular desires of security and predictability (Betz, 2008). 
 
Populism may emerge because of an out-of-balance state between two factors: liberal 
constitutionalism and democratic majoritarianism, between an idea that law should be inferred 
as a supreme authority and a concept of will of majority as primary cause of legitimization. 
Albertazzi and McDonnell observe that populists perceive themselves as ‘true democrats” 
who give voice to true popular opinions, to complaints regularly neglected by authorities and 
they struggle to reclaim people sovereignty from elites in power (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 
2008, p. 4). In addition, they realise the vision of new rights along with guarantees and 
liberties which will be introduced once gained enough power in the Parliament to legislate 
(Mudde, 2007: 279). For this purpose, populists are aiming at special target voters and, as a 
consequence, need to adopt a specific language, simple and direct. This way, they highlight 
the discrepancy between them and bureaucratic politicians jargon, which can hardly be 
understood by ordinary people. 
 
Their typical voters are usually identified as people feeling social and political alienation, 
who do not belong to anything related to culture, religion or professional organizations, 
people who have difficulty in finding their proper place in capitalistic, post-industrial reality, 
the so-called “losers of globalization” (Pasquino, 2005). As Margaret Canovan maintains, it is 
possible to notice in populist discourse three enticements to the “people”: the first concerns 
united people, that is a country or nation in opposition to portions and parties intent to 
division; “our” people counter posed to the ”others” who do not take part in our group (e.g. 
immigrants) and ordinary people, who are lined up against an extremely competent, 
cosmopolitan elite. There are two groups that have been distinguished as populists’ enemies: 
the “top” elites, and “bottom” immigrants, or other groups believed to instill fear into the 
unity of a community. 
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 However, these hybrid parties/movements do not want to abolish democratic system as one 
would think. They want, in fact, to reinstate and improve it in a way that will re-establish the 
main principle of its existence – direct sovereignty. 21st century populism has been 
challenging established structures of power, elites and their out of touch values. Their activists 
accentuate the role of people in a political decision-making process. According to this point of 
view, those in charge deceived people trust by nurturing their own interests and objectives, 
ignoring the original intention for what they were elected and who they are supposed to 
represent. These days, people seem not to be interested in politics. Therefore, they are willing 
to find a charismatic head who “knows” them and give voice to those who cannot speak. A 
populist leader is perceived as a man of destiny, anti-political, who can supply simple, clear 
solutions to problems experienced by ordinary citizens (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008: 5, 
25). This leader is connected to the figure of a “charismatic strongman”, ruling on the basis of 
“a cult of a leader” and is usually portrayed as masculine and potentially violent (Mudde & 
Rovira Kaltmwasser 2017: 63). 
 
There is an emphasis, therefore, on the audacity to take difficult decisions which depends 
on anti-intellectualism, and it is often accomplished by stressing a stereotyped leader’s 
virility, the use of simple and straightforward language, and leader’s charisma (ibid: 64-68). 
Moreover, basic law on individual and civil rights, confidence in conspiracy theories, sharing 
some themes recalling communism and fascism, and above all else foreign policy grounded 
on isolationism can be seen identified as a threat for democracy maintenance (Held, 1996: 63-
65). Usually, it is a further sign that association between citizens and government is not 
operating in the proper way and as a result, sufficient space is created to populist 
entrepreneurs (Akkerman, 2003: 156-158). It has been argued that this prospective beneficial 
effect can be detected as functional for a healthy democracy because it compels elites to open 
doors to party competition and expand their political agenda (Akkerman, 2003: 156-154). 
Nonetheless, one can presume that populist parties will cease to exist once the task is 
17 
 completed, for their “raison d’être” disappear. Actually, in the specific case of right populist 
parties, reality appears different. Those national-populist movements started to play a regular 
role in the political debate, thus attracting a broader electorate than mainstream parties 
(Decker, 2003: 49). Their political agenda has been developed trying to get the balance right 
between limiting their plans and becoming accepted by the established system, or remaining 
extreme and dealing with restrictions and isolation, however strengthening hard-core 
members. 
 
 
1.6 The Politics of Fear: Form – Content – Renationalisation 
 
It is important not to overlook that right-wing parties are not only connected to form, but 
also to content. In their speech, there is usually a perpetual fear depending on numerous real 
or made up) perils. They do in fact supply the scapegoats accused of damaging their societies: 
economic migrants and the EU. That is why we have leitmotifs such as “take back control of 
our border”. This politics of fear according to Ruth Wodak is “very strong in persuading 
audiences who don’t have much information to vote with their gut feeling, which is where 
rational discussions don’t find a space” (2015: 186). Wodak, furthermore, maintains that a 
populist leader is portrayed as a sort of a frontman recalling pop-culture: really charismatic, 
apparently down to earth, connected to people and the new media system (e.g Twitter). He is, 
in addition, context-dependent: there is a specific selection of meeting places, attention to the 
clothes they wear – even if Farage cannot be identified as a cross dresser like the Italian 
Matteo Salvini or Beppe Grillo; an accurate selection of accompanying performers on stage 
intro music, ranging from Europe’s “The Final Countdown” to Robin Hood soundtrack 
(examples related to Farage’s “Say No to Europe Campaign” Tour”. 
 
 
1.7 The Language of Populism 
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 In linguistics, populism has not been as exhaustively studied as in social sciences. Even so, 
discourse analysis can grant productive understanding into the communicative techniques and 
operations used by politicians and parties (see Wodak 2013, 2015). Some interesting features 
related to specific linguistic methods, in particular figurative language, personal pronouns and 
prosodic marking, are employed in populist discourse amid disparate communication types 
such as public speeches or interviews, with the purpose of conceiving a persuasive portrait of 
fear. 
 
In the first place there is the idea of “the people” as a (frequently racial) “pure” 
community, introducing the anachronistic image of the nation as a “body”. This nation, the 
argument goes, has to be both re-established and preserved against negative entities both 
internal (establishment, opposition groups) and external (economic migrants). The inland or 
“heartlands” a large number of these campaigners profess to fight for are allegedly under 
menace from numerous outsiders, leading among them “elites”, ethnic or religious groups, 
immigrants and refugees
4
 (Wodak, 2015). 
 
Furthermore, it is presumed that populism is increasing, both in the rhetoric of politicians 
and in their media depiction, and this can be explained by the growing anti-immigration 
attitude among voters (Kriesi et al., 2006). In this view, populism is an anti-establishment and 
anti-political image, where the elite is said to disregard the homeland and its purity, let alone 
the worries of the people. Others define populism as a more clever rhetoric “designed to tap 
feelings of ressentiment and exploit them politically” (Betz, 2002: 198), policies that are 
acutely (ethno-)nationalistic, anti-European amalgamation, often tyrannical, xenophobic and 
usually focused on the noticeable examples of globalization and immigration (Kitschelt, 1997; 
Rydgren, 2005). Such policies, in a certain way, epitomise and legitimise dynamics of 
inclusion and exclusion. 
 
 
4 http://theconversation.com/right-wing-populism-is-surging-on-both-sides-of-the-atlantic-heres-why-47876 
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 Given that the label ‘populist’ is frequently adopted in a belittling sense and hardly 
accepted or welcomed by those thus named, the issue with populism is that one is usually 
dependent on its definition in the media. We could however observe a common wish to 
restrict the law of immigrants in right-wing populist speeches throughout Europe (Ennser, 
2012). As these requests are for the most part expressed employing a popular democratic 
equal grammar through a mention to the signifier “the people,” it should be supposed that 
they, in turn, will be discredited and condemned as populists. Thus, populism arises as an 
empty signifier par excellence, and as a consequence a ship capable of containing a surplus of 
heterogeneous connotations, turning into the synecdoche of an omnipresent evil and 
associated with all its conceivable manifestations: absurdity, demagogy, viciousness, 
dishonesty, destruction, and irrationalism (Stavrakakis, 2014: 510). In relation to this theory, 
it has been argued that populists use hidden prejudices to stir up fear: fear of being deprived 
of jobs, fear of “foreigners” and their culture, fear of losing national supremacy, fear of new 
gender positions, fear of being left behind. 
 
Basically, right-wing populism prospers by imagining and attempting to create existential 
fights between “the people”, “the elite” and “others”. Right-wing populists flourished by 
injecting anxiety on numerous tangible or made-up dangers, and especially by blaming 
specific communities or groups for frightening or really harming “our” societies. While 
various available political orientations count on attacking different groups to a certain degree, 
right-wing populists adopt this strategy in a precise and bold way. As a matter of fact, they 
usually captivate voters by breaking taboos, giving voice to “those who cannot speak”. These 
movements claim to speak for “the people”, anyway promptly delineated. Their supporters, in 
turn, appreciate not being treated with arrogance. Similarly to what mainstream politicians do 
to a certain extent, they provide oversimplified answers for complicated problems with clear 
rebellious quotations, and profitably focus on different groups with tailored programmes to 
fulfil everybody’s demands. 
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 On the first level, populism originates from the integral polysemy which indicates the 
category of the people in contemporary European languages. The term people refers to the 
entirety of a determined political community, to citizenship as a homogeneous body politic 
(hence the copious references to the American Constitution’s “We, the people”), and defines 
“the poor, the disinherited, and the excluded” (Stavrakakis, 2014: 506). To put in other terms, 
it refers to the losers alienated from political life, left out from the dignity of political rights 
and economic compensation. However, it is fundamental to point out the populist style has 
nothing to do with the idea of unimportant or summary, but is actually necessary to 
comprehend populism’s stance in modern political scenario, in addition to its flexible and 
eclectic inclination. That of populism is an essentially performative political style in which the 
leader is identified as the performer, the people as the audience, crisis and mass media as the 
stage whereupon populism enacts (Moffitt, 2016). 
 
However, the linguist is not a sociologist or a political scientist, but he/she has the 
opportunity to take a look at the way words are employed, in order to contextualise the use of 
vocabulary with the purpose of obtaining all the information available for a proper 
interpretation. Shapiro indicates an interesting viewpoint when illustrating the distinction 
between language and discourse: “poststructuralist modes of analysis emphasize ‘discourse’ 
rather than language because the concept of discourse implies a concern with the meaning and 
value producing practises in language rather than simply the relationship between utterances 
and their referents” (Shapiro 1989: 14). 
 
Discourse analysis concentrates specifically on the manner in which diverse kinds of social 
processes are represented as being features of a characteristic named “globalization”, and the 
manner political parties plan to build up their consensus against this phenomenon. As a matter 
of fact, UKIP reproduces several central parts of the traditional globalization discourse. The 
nat-populist party indeed uses as resource the same list of words about globalization in a way 
that presents the European Union in quite a distinct light. In addition, politics on the negatives 
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 of migration has been a consequential role of its charm in recent years, and linking that stance 
with a refined debate about globalization’s importance for regional orders has been a test 
bench. 
 
There has been a need from UKIP, at a certain point, to surpass the appearance of 
regressive isolationism, especially for the purpose to take distance from the extreme-right 
British National Party. This interpretation believes in their adoption of the usual rhetorical 
strategy with the purpose of employing this type of discourse to communicate modernity and 
to limit disagreeing voices. In other words, this modern times theory is a statement that 
globalisation is a new though radical fracture from the political economy of a time gone by, 
depicted as a new world where traditional models of life and governing cannot be retrieved. 
 
UKIP’s peculiar discourse of Europe and globalization can loosen this sense of anxiety by 
presenting the Eurosceptic purpose as the appropriate concern of an up-to-date, scrupulous 
party. This characteristic appeal to globalisation contextualized as a question of common 
sense, which is well-known with the party, can be understood with the fact UKIP has tried to 
reorganise the debate on Europe in a way that its withdrawal orientation is no longer 
associated with an old aggressive nationalism. In sum, the plea of globalisation can be 
interpreted as a crux attempt to texture a distinctly modern additional twist according to 
Fairclough’s terms (Ford, 2015: 35). 
 
A distinctive trait concerning populist style is the use of ‘highly emotional, slogan-based, 
tabloid-style language’ (Mazzoleni et al., 2003: 5), exaggerations and ‘verbal radicalism’ 
(Betz & Immerfall, 1998: 2). However, despite the fact populists are hesitant about politics, 
with the country defined in desperate situation they accentuate a feeling of acute political 
pressure. Their style is considered as straightforward, highlighting determination and 
attacking others for their purported self-satisfaction. In addition, the populist style is marked 
by its antagonism to the existing order and its association with the common people, whose 
language they employ to reject the elitist complex language of representative politics (Mudde, 
2007: 88). 
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 Moreover, this straightforward style turns into a frequent characteristic in party 
propaganda, whose key message results into an anti-establishment stance and a discourse of 
exclusion. The supposed ascent is said to be spot in the media, particularly in popular press 
and certain kinds of talk-shows, fascinated by the frank style and the policies claiming to the 
turning back to the status-quo ante. Moreover, straightforward style and anti-immigration 
rhetoric are considered as typical characteristic of right-wing parties. 
 
Rhetoric is a potent instrument employed by populist activists. Populist rhetoric, it has 
been argued, relates not only to making supposed vacant demagogic tactics. Their discourse is 
built on denial and explicitness and its most powerful element is found in emotion. Moreover, 
populists often invoke to dangers and connected pledges in order to properly defend the 
“people” from real (or made up) perils. From the moment populism rests on basic norms 
originated from the common sense of the people, its rhetoric could be adorned with mentions 
to national heritage and customs since opposed to the so-called “multiculturalism” attributed 
to the elites, and eventually linked to nationalism even if not forcibly comparable to it. The 
presence of a charismatic leader who acts as a firebrand with his/her straightforward mottos 
appears to be essential: he/she incites indeed feelings of resentments, fears and possibilities, 
and offers quick and easy solutions to complex social and political issues. Somehow, the 
charisma of populist leaders allows a powerful and prosperous kind of rhetoric. We hold to be 
true that subjects who declare discourses are not independent entities, but rather actors who 
are constituted by (and authors of) discursive processes. So, the subject’s declaration is 
always something belonging to beforehand constituted linguistic unit in a language, and as a 
consequence the action of the subject in language is necessarily historical and ideological 
(Coutinho, Carvalho Lopes & do Nascimento 2017: 685). As Bakhtin maintained, every 
single discourse is impregnated of scraps deriving from other discourses, linguistic units that 
may be expressly marked out or blurred with other enunciated. As a matter of fact, a line of 
discourse may absorb, negate, refuse or repeat other discourses. 
23 
 The concept of populism does not have to be labelled as necessarily negative nor 
necessarily positive since it entails a series of antithetical expressions. Hence the enormous 
multiplicity of populist mixes in the global area: anti-institutional (customized, autocratic, 
dependent on a charismatic leader) and institutional (elaborating new institutions of direct 
democratic involvement and representation, working as means for the claims of ruled out 
components of society), brutally antagonistic and agonistic, right-winger and progressive, 
polished and blue, democratic and anti-democratic; street-populisms and populisms at power, 
top-down and bottom-up, etc. (Panizza, 2000: 190). Following again what Ernesto Laclau 
asserted, I would move to the next chapter with the assumption that populism “is not a fixed 
constellation but a series of discursive resources which can be put to very different uses.” 
(2005: 176). 
 
 
1.8 The Discursive Construction of National Identity 
 
Identity never indicates something stagnant, unvarying or essential, but rather often an 
element positioned on the flowing time, continually mutating, a component involved in a 
process. That being said, the various discursive constructions of national identity are shaped 
in different ways depending on the context and on the public in which they come to notice, 
each of them can be recognised with reference to subject matters, plans and argumentative 
models, and based on how they linguistically realised. Moreover, a national culture is a series 
of discursive construct identities by producing significance about the concept of ‘nation’ with 
which persons can recognise themselves (identify). 
 
Following Wodak, we can come upon three national identities as distinctive patterns of 
social identities, which are produced and re-produced, as well as modified and discursively 
deconstructed. For Frank Robert Vivelo (1981: 55), we identify the word ‘culture’ as an 
organized approach of norms and basics for appropriate behaviour, comparable to language 
grammar, which set the parameters for ‘proper’ speaking. This feature strives for a perception 
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 (well displayed in discourses) of national character as a monotonous, uninterrupted and 
unvarying being. According to Hall instead, national identity is depicted in narratives of 
national culture as the authentic identity already existing in the nature of all elements, but 
sometimes latent and in need to be awakened from inactive periods: 
 
 
‘People are not only legal citizens of a nation; they participate in the idea of the nation as represented in its 
national culture. A nation is a symbolic community …’ 
(Hall, 1996: 612) 
 
 
When dissertating on national identity and its construction we cannot leave out a necessary 
prerequisite, that is the “historical memory” or “collective memory” as called by Halbwachs 
(1996) or Peter Burke (1989). However, from the viewpoint of Kolakowski (1995), whether 
the content of historical memory is full, partially true or invented is a question of relative 
importance. The more the actual or imaginary memories goes back into the past, the more 
firmly national identity is sustained. Wodak (2009: 34) indeed reports a quote from 
Kolakowski that says ‘Some nationalities which have formed just recently invent an ad hoc 
artificial relation to the past without the existence of real, verifiable connections’ (Kolakowski 
1995: 33). This is a clear mention to globalisation and its deviation, needless to say the 
consequent perils of a drop in national independence and pride, all concerns massively present 
in contemporary nationalistic narratives. In sum, we can notice how context, origin, the 
relationship between continuity and tradition, nation and transform-nation, eternity and 
anticipation are significant ordering standards for the construction of an effective narrative in 
nat-populist parties. 
 
 
1.9 The Construction of UKIP Identity: In-Group Out-Group 
 
In-group and out-group constitute an analytical dichotomy with a considerably long history 
of theory, which originates in the areas of sociology and psychology. Communicative 
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 strategies of constituting in- and out- groups have an important part in EU-negative populist 
discourse, for the reason they can elicit particular emotions like fear and rage. 
 
We suppose that given linguistic resources are employed to form an in-group - principally 
being conceptualised as we - and an out-group, differentiating from the in-group and depicted 
as threatening to its inner members. Most important, linguistic elements mirror principal 
referential strategies adopted in a corpus to construe the in-group on the discursive plan. 
When dealing with a nationalist party, in-groups and out-groups usually correspond to the 
dichotomy us vs. them. When dealing with a researcher, it is more supposed to be a 
differentiation between two different they. 
 
De Cillia et al. stress certain aspects which could be related to common culture, a common 
historical belief system, a common (small) territory and a common language as the glue that 
manages to keep an in-group together (1999: 149). The in-group analysis deals with the 
parties’ portrait and understanding of themselves and each other. On the contrary, the out-
groups refer to all those who are clearly identified by all parties as persons not belonging to 
the in-group and the analysis mainly deals with the parties construction of their immigration 
discourses. This is significant inasmuch separation between constructions of “US” vs. 
“THEM” or “SELF” vs. “OTHER” - could it be on the inside or among nations or, in 
addition, between several economic, religious or ethnic groups – still results to be a 
considerable political dare. 
 
When studying closely discourse aforementioned representations of self against other, 
Hansen (2006) employs a methodological approach of searching for two procedures that work 
together in order to build identity: a positive procedure of connection and a negative 
procedure of distinction. For what concerns the case of populist parties, the “Other” could 
possibly include political élites who, according to their rhetoric, are distant from and 
operating against people’s interests these groups declare to represent. 
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 That being said, Farage asserts that only by quitting the European Union could “we get 
back the ability to strike free trade deals” (The Spectator, 2013). This way, Farage considers 
the EU as an Other that limits Britain from progress. It is therefore clear that configurating 
“us” against “them/other” is a serious element in using identity and difference. 
 
What I am going to realize in the chapter dedicated to corpus analysis is, among other 
things, to investigate the allocation of word forms concerning self-representation in UKIP 
manifestos/programs/speeches and how the party’s preference of the we pronoun can be 
defined as an indicator of heightened self-confidence and as an attempt to separate themselves 
from the established parties, which furthermore stresses collective rather than individual 
course of action (De Fina et al., 2006). Linguistic elements mirror principal referential 
strategies adopted in a corpus to construe the in-group on the discursive plan. 
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 Chapter 2 
 
 
The Brexit Case 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1 Brexit: a “Prophecy” 
 
 
There was a ‘prophecy’ a considerable period of time before the first 1975 referendum to 
become a member of the EEC. As a matter of fact, in January 1963, General Charles de 
Gaulle held a press conference to explain his motivations for refusing the British application 
for EU membership. Some, although not all of his statements, could still find their reasons of 
being today. The point is Britain is closed to outside influence, maritime, connected to its 
trade, markets, foodstocks with Commonwealth and in many cases very distant countries. In 
addition, its sector is basically industrial and commercial, not agricultural. As de Gaulle 
pointed out in his speech: 
 
“She has, in all her work, very special, very original, habits and traditions. In short, the nature, 
structure, circumstances peculiar to England are very different from those of other continentals. 
How can Britain, in the way that she lives, produces, trades, be incorporated into the Common 
Market as it has been conceived and functions?… It is predictable that the cohesion of all its 
members, which would soon be very large, very diverse, would not last for very long and that, 
in fact, it would seem like a colossal Atlantic community under American dependence and 
direction, and that is not at all what France wanted to do and is doing, which is a strictly 
European construction” (De Gaulle, 1963). 
 
 
It is important to say British governments have been charged with responsibility for this 
situation, for the reason they have not rarely employed their leverage to slow down the 
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 process of European integration. In fact, Britain excluded itself from the Euro and Schengen 
zone, and obstructed the expansion of certified majority voting into foreign, tax, policy and 
defence sections. It has been argued (by the Bruges Group
5
) there was no reason to think that 
this attitude would have changed in the future. Nonetheless, it has been stressed for years that 
in Britain, various EU rules are supposed to be construed as a vicious assault on the British 
way of living. It has been furthermore asserted that “Britons are afraid of the European Union 
because they are forced to adapt their specific cultural and institutional rules and values 
towards what emerges as a common European norm, which they dislike.” 6This quote refers 
to the concept of being European in the English sense, where British identity is threatened 
with the prospect of flattening to the same level of other already phagocytized countries. 
 
The first UK referendum in Europe was held in 1975. Back then, Conservative Prime 
Minister Ted Heath announced a referendum to placate European discontent in his party. In 
1975, immigration hardly surfaced as an issue of relevance. In fact, according to a BBC 
report, only 41,000 people left Britain, let alone those who came into the country. At the time, 
the economy was failing if contrasted with Europe, which was far richer and certainly more 
successful than Britain. Comparing the referendums of 1975 and 2016 demonstrates how 
British politics has changed in essence. After joining the Bloc in 1973, many Britons had the 
impression their island nation — a former imperial power with strong links to the United 
States of America — was definitely different from its European neighbourhood. Less than a 
year after joining, Britain was requesting a total reform to the common agricultural policy 
(CAP) and in 1975 a Labour government, led by Harold Wilson, called a referendum. In its 
first nation-wide decision on whether to stay within the EEC or to leave, Britain opted in this 
case to remain in the Community. 
 
 
 
5 The Bruges Group aims to promote discussion on the European Union and to advance the education of 
the public on European affairs.
  
6 Behnisch, A. J. For Britain, joining Europe was associated with national decline and loss of great power 
status. New Statesman, 16.12.2002. Online 10 September 2015 http://www.newstatesman.com/node/144445  
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 The degree of British Euroscepticism has naturally changed over time: for example, British 
refused to participate in the Schengen agreement and significantly dismantled border controls 
with other EU countries. Moreover, Britain has been experiencing a large increase of nativist 
sentiments for at least a decade, and this attitude certainly provided a boost for the Brexit 
propaganda and resulting Leave victory. 
 
UKIP’s leader Nigel Farage has widely come to light as the architect of the Leave 
movement. Patriotic commander of disappointed revivalists, Farage has been in those years 
the partisan of a figurative battle between the elites and the masses.
7
 And the average UKIP 
voters’ discontent is not merely narrowed about policies, but on a general sense of anxiety 
about where society is heading and how they do not feel fit for it. However, it is important to 
highlight that UKIP declares itself as an “evolved”, “moderate” nationalist political group as 
well as a Right Libertarian Party. It rejects hard xenophobe nationalism and claims to be 
"open and inclusive to anyone who wishes to identify with Britain, regardless of ethnic or 
religious background" (UKIP, 2010). Farage’s capacity is to offer a comforting and often 
humorous narrative of an English-inflected Britishness in an era surrounded by uncertainty, 
crisis and change (Yates, 2015: 105). That is in part because Farage is most likely one of the 
few British politicians able to incite public opinion. Nonetheless, the former UKIP leader’s 
achievement is a case study of how economic downturn is facing old certainties and 
transforming European politics. 
 
 
2.2 UKIP and the Brexit Campaign 
 
It is a fact that populism in Britain has spread in a softer manner if compared to other right-
wing parties in the rest of Europe. The case of UKIP is indeed an unprecedented phenomenon, 
even if their former leader’s speeches have been branded as the product of mere chauvinist 
 
 
7 http://www.firstpost.com/world/we-have-done-it-meet-the-architect-of-brexit-ukips-nigel-farage-
2853280.html 
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 anti-establishment cheap talk. Founded in 1991 by Alan Sked as the Anti-Federalist League of 
Conservatives let down by the Maastricht Treaty, it has lately become a primarily anti-EU 
organisation which throughout the decades focussed for people who firmly believe that the 
social and financial solidity of Britain in the future will only be guaranteed by ethnopluralism, 
rather than integration of immigrants, and taking back more power once withdrawn from the 
EU. The formerly negligible right-wing populist UKIP has become the most rapid increasing 
political party in the United Kingdom, and is becoming headlines because of its anti-EU and 
anti-immigration rhetoric not limited in their country but all over Europe, thus generating 
anxiety among the mainstream parties and corroding their support base. 
 
In addition, over the last half-decade UKIP’s image as a single-issue party has been 
transformed as they more extensively spotlighted onto issues such as economy, taxes, 
instruction, health, etc. in addition to its predominant questioning platforms of immigration 
and the EU. Farage often asserted in his public speeches or editorials that before becoming 
part of the union, England was acknowledged as “the land of liberty”. The Eurosceptic leader 
indeed considers the EU as an undeveloped-economic union. 
 
For the first time Britain, regularly an uncomfortable member in the European Union, 
becomes in 2014 topic of the day as the United Kingdom Independence Party reached the top 
of the national poll and triggered crisis within media and political class. Since then, the 
national populist party has started to take part as container of common discontent on a 
national scale while construing a polarising story of what is going wrong with Great Britain 
and solutions to fix the situation. However, the way UKIP has dulled old politics together the 
ability of catalysing fears and emotions of let-down citizens is widely disputed. 
 
The request for a referendum to determine a withdrawal from EU is an extension of a 
certain unusual attitude, which evokes in turn “British superiority” (Gifford, 2010: 329). 
Noticeable is the fact the success of Euroscepticism in contemporary Britain has meant a 
ceaseless debate over the EU in essence entrapped in wearying calls for a membership 
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 referendum where the result in theory appeared much less certain than in 1975. From this 
viewpoint, the United Kingdom Independence Party made terrific progress in 2014 European 
elections, indeed coming first with 28% on a programme combining distrust in EU with the 
aim to contain immigration. In this perspective, the UK is far from exclusivity, as a fair 
amount of Eurosceptic parties across Western Europe are gaining popularity with equivalent 
meaning, therefore giving contribution to the fragmentation of party systems (Hanley, 2015), 
even by exploiting the weakness of centre-left parties that traditionally built their electoral 
base on working class votes. As the end result of the 2015 General Election proved - which 
recorded a pronounced trend to vote for UKIP in traditional left-wing constituencies in 
England and Wales - Labour in Britain tends to become particularly vulnerable when dealing 
with immigration-EU concerns that UKIP seems to easily manage. 
 
This kind of situation represents the perfect subject for a peculiar feature that was 
obviously not present in 1975, that is a populist opposition to the EU prepared for action in 
the form of a professionalized and financially supported Eurosceptic political party, namely 
UKIP. Its nationalist Euroscepticism is of course typical from populist organisations, as it is 
combined with an anti-elite disapproval of established parties. Eventually, the double anti-
elite/anti-EU blend is more electorally potent today than ever (Glencross, 2014). 
 
However, UKIP has been widely described by left-leaning media as a right-wing British 
nationalist party, encouraging a narrative of deterioration and disloyalty from the elite, 
devoted to make Britain independent from the European Union and uncontrolled immigration, 
fond of traditionalism and officially non-racist, though often crossing the borderline of racist 
prejudice in a manner we could define as “para-racist”. As a matter of fact, in spite of these 
attacks from mainstream parties, to Nigel Farage the UK will only be far better out of the 
European Union than remaining in an organisation with unelected bureaucrats ruling ‘their’ 
country, as he has often claimed. Actually, it has been the UK Independence Party – also 
unofficially defined as the right offshoot of the Conservative party highly committed to 
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 withdrawal from the European Union – that has taken advantage of this increase in popularity 
of anti-politics and played a key role both in obtaining the referendum and helping to swing 
the vote towards the Leave side. The outcome of the Brexit referendum in the United 
Kingdom on whether to stay in or leave the European Union resulted in a win of the leave side 
by 51.9%. 
 
UKIP’s narrative in anticipation of a Remain/Leave outcome is portrayal of a language 
targeted to what was regarded as “anti-politics”. This new societal setting depicts a 
widespread disaffection in indirect democracies, expressed in low levels of satisfaction with 
Westminster’s behaviour by left-behind citizens, loss of confidence in politicians, and the 
impression they have no say in matter when is their life the Government is discussing about. 
Anyway, the party led by Nigel Farage has come out to be a particular crossbreeding between 
Populism and Nationalism, and even though it takes no concrete measures because it is cut off 
for the First Past The Post System (in Britain), it comes out its effectiveness in employing 
media pressure to obtain a Referendum considered as a chimera only few months before the 
official announcement given by the former Prime Minister David Cameron. 
 
We will see through the narrative built in the “Say NO to EU” campaign how in this last 
period UKIP has grown in reliability, fetching in most cases disillusioned voters yearning for 
a populist party that claims to give voice to those who cannot speak, and will comment upon 
the UK has voted to leave the European Union following a referendum on its membership and 
succeed in taking “their country back”. The data analysed for this thesis show reasons that led 
to quit a “supranational political union” appear to be complex and multi-faceted: issues of 
immigration, finances, healthcare and stolen sovereignty clearly came into play throughout 
the campaign, with the Brexit strategy plan evidently more successful than Bremain (at least 
in England and Wales), specifically when it focused the question of the uncontrolled 
migration and the construction of a combined threat discourse. As a matter of fact, while 
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 UKIP continued to distance itself from racism, the party did take a more restrictive position 
on immigration (Gardner, 2006; 176). 
 
However, it is important to highlight that UKIP declares itself as an “evolved” nationalist 
party. In fact it rejects pejorative labels of hard xenophobe nationalism and claims to be "open 
and inclusive to anyone who wishes to identify with Britain, regardless of ethnic or religious 
background" (UKIP, 2010). According to their manifestos and speeches, the European Union 
is nothing more than a cartel of governments that tries to gain power by harmonizing the fiscal 
and regulatory legislation in every member State. This is a feature one can find in all these 
new populist parties across Europe, that is their distrust of and firmly strong opposition to the 
influence of the EU on their own domestic politics. In addition, a negative image of Brussels 
is what unifies UKIP and parties of whatever wing throughout Europe. 
 
 
For what concerns UKIP and their policy, Farage advocates direct democracy in contrast to 
‘representative politics’. Although not an exclusively populist party (Whitaker & Lynch, 
2011: 5), UKIP presents itself as wanting to give power back to the people via local 
democracy and the use of referenda. Strong is the rhetorical emphasis on British citizens 
opposed to European Bureaucracy defined as a Jaggernaut, a threat which weakens the 
sovereignty of States. Populist stances usually support people and their fight against the elite-
machine, and their elements comfortably merge into Nationalism, where the UK will profit, 
according to Farage’s vision, from acting independently to the benefit of the country rather 
than collectively focusing international goals. 
 
In the end, the pivot-stance for what concerns immigration and multiculturalism might 
evoke racism for progressive minds, even though firmly within the limits of respectable 
language. Farage himself has indeed been given by British popular press and tabloids a plain 
support, despite regularly exposed UKIP candidates or his (uncertain) links to xenophobe and 
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 racist parties as the Northern League in Italy, the Front National from Marine Le Pen in 
France and the Finnish nationalists. 
 
 
 
2.3 Societal Changes 
 
Some of the motivations for the UK’s referendum result to leave the European Union 
(51.9%) are vague and complicated but mostly ascribed to political, economic, and social 
decline. The UK Referendum campaign, exactly like EU policies, has drawn attention to the 
economic consequences of Brexit while not giving massive consideration to its prospective 
social impact, even though the economic and the social are so firmly bound. As a matter of 
fact, there is a new cliché proposed by non lined-up media defining right-wing populism to be 
a kind of politics that splits the world into a battle between “us” and the powerful elite 
“them”, where the “elite” is identified as cause of all problems. 
 
The habit of tagging movements as populist constitutes a bias that they are morally inferior 
to the unpopular elite. According to their detractors, the so-called ‘Brexiters’ represent 
nothing but resentful ‘Little Englanders’ who do not tolerate the country’s successful 
globalisation control, old bigots who reject the prosperous multicultural society that Britain 
has become, xenophobic losers who want to destroy what good has been done in the country 
or at best a bunch of uneducated, simplistic and narrow-minded people who have proven to be 
easy lure for unscrupulous demagogues. The Leave victory has been reported in most aligned 
press as a victory of the people of yesteryear over the people of tomorrow, young and 
cosmopolitan. This has partly been the outcome of extensive macro-changes which include, 
for example, a process of changing from industrial to postindustrial society, and a pervasive 
globalization that have caused higher chance of stress, frustration and disenchantment among 
those whose situation has become compromised as a result of these changes. 
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 Their starting point was the transition from an industrial to a post-industrial economy. With 
the aftermath of this passage, new social organizations followed that cut across traditional 
class divisions. Betz (1994) focused on a new type of lower class, social groups that were in 
particular exposed to the economic turnarounds. Significant is the birth of a new request for 
innovative technology and cultural competences in the labour market, while conventional 
labour abilities lost competitiveness. In fact cultural codes, and ability to accommodate to a 
new continuous stream of technological progresses, became more effective than muscle, 
physical ability to last and mechanical know-how. A considerable part of the industrial labour 
force have indeed turned its back on socialist and social democratic parties and chose the right 
by voting nationalist parties. 
 
For what concerns socio-demographic aspects, these have been properly summarised by 
Givens (2005, ch. 3). However, the most noticeable trait of the extreme-right vote is that it is 
predominantly male (Mudde 2007: 111-118). Moreover, extreme-right voters are inclined to 
be young, working, under or lower middle class and occupied in the private sector. Reports of 
racist or far right political parties have frequently maintained that their supporters come from 
borderline groups, such the unqualified white working class who live in impoverished areas 
that have experienced direct question of immigration, which again encourages the assumption 
that this kind of politics have the power to attract groups out of the mainstream, whose social 
conditions have induced them to disclosed extremist beliefs. 
 
 
 
2.4 Crowd Manipulation – Rudiments of Propaganda 
 
Speaking of icons, imagination and narration are fundamental ingredients in populist 
politics. The populist rhetoric is centred on the charging of a person or a concern with 
symbolic relevance in order to unite different storylines around a face or a slogan. 
Notwithstanding, without imagination, a leader cannot persuade the people – which is a 
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 requirement for populism. People tend to recognize themselves in certain rhetorical figures 
introduced to them such as the working-class, taxpaying, and the decent people. In particular, 
just because of his ambiguous attitude, populism can be an advanced technique for gathering 
heterogeneous electorate with heterogeneous necessities. 
 
However, a certain amount of components of the community are excluded from “the 
people” and from political recognition as effect. The development of images and storytelling 
places, through negative identification, specific groups out from the community. Those groups 
are identified as “constitutive-outside”. In an essay by the French philosopher Althusser titled 
“Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses” (1970), this process of ideological 
manipulation has been described as “interpellation”, whose implementation happens during 
people’s ideological shaping: they feel intimately appealed and addressed by an ideological 
discourse they closely support. Interpellation stands for recruiting process through which 
symbols and storylines are used to be suitable for people’s ordinary world in order to fit into 
specific political frameworks by portraying existing situations in words. 
 
When referring to the people, populists are actually only talking about their supporters or, 
as Nigel Farage clearly stated, "the real people": in this case, 52 percent who voted to leave 
the EU. The ability of populists about performing crisis has been believed to allow them to 
separate the people from the elite and to related Others in order to thoroughly facilitate the 
political landscape, and to show resolute leadership and easy solutions as means for 
containing or preventing the crisis. The conception of crisis may be considered as something 
not absolutely external to populism, but as an inner component of populism itself since it 
represents a political style. This interpretation displays that while crisis may constitute an 
efficient step for populists, it is a constant they play an influential role in “setting the stage” 
themselves by advocating and performing crisis (Moffit, 2016: 1). 
 
 
 
2.5 British Euroscepticism  
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 The Brexit vote, paired with the ascent of Eurosceptic parties, was a strong memorandum 
that not a few Europeans view the EU as unwelcome, with its little understanding of ordinary 
citizens. Basically, a spineless economic condition and a prevailing sense of supranational 
subjugation made it nothing but a burden. Democracy is anyway always respected, but the 
Brexit outcome confirms how the level of dissatisfaction about its essence has arisen since the 
2009 crisis. All those conditions have been employed for cryptic reasons in the semi-rebel 
rhetoric of alternative organisations determined to provide direct solutions to issues like 
immigration, political discontent, globalisation and, of course, the European bureaucratic 
system. 
 
As a matter of fact, Euroscepticism parties gather these key issues through connections 
between opposition to immigration, rage and apprehension about the flood of asylum-seekers, 
bitterness about the power that the EU exerts over national policies and concerns about the 
new EU statute. The feeling that economic migration, asylum-seeking and Europe were out of 
control was deeply perceived. For example, it is now a fact that there was in a consistent part 
of British citizens a strong feeling that there was little or no of migration-control and a 
pervasive supervision ‘Europe’ was accused of exerting over UK policies. Britain, according 
to Farage, was seen as a ‘weakling’ down there in mainland while there was a certain esteem 
for the French and Australians systems who in different context defended their national 
interests. Public statements from Eurosceptic groups disclosed a sense of frustrated 
nationalism, and their own industrially depressed areas described as the fault of a 
‘cheerleading’ political class that refuses to accept the dangers of immigration and European 
domination over national freedom. 
 
Anyway, from the position of economic, political and intellectual elites in the Eurozone, 
Europe and populism are viewed as the two opposites of a drastic contrast. Needless to say, 
the return to national pride, the overemphasis on nation’s principles go together with borders 
control, restriction of foreign imports and, in some radical groups, with a hostile xenophobic 
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 social atmosphere. As a matter of fact, populist parties discredit all supra-national alliances no 
matter whether in government or in opposition. However, not all populisms could be placed 
on the same level, nor do they consult the same people, or share same characteristics and 
prerequisites. Moreover, it is impossible to think of an unchanging Europe from a diachronic 
standpoint. We observe therefore a reverse of traditional terms: the so-called post-democratic 
Europe is a version of Europe which has become part of the problem and not a solution 
anymore, taking more and more the shape of a tyrannical monster, a dangerous transformation 
that only the return of the popular seems able to dominate. Today the main source of concern 
with regard to ECE migration is along the lines of social welfare and labour market. Powell 
(1968), similarly, expressed concern for British nationals being made “strangers in their own 
country”, not being able to get jobs, “obtain school places” and seeing their “neighbourhoods 
changed beyond recognition”8, which is also expressively articulated by UKIP leader Nigel 
Farage, but increasingly also by other political figures in the country. 
 
On the contrary, European elites have seemed to invest their political future in the 
formulation of an extreme anti-populist programme. It is a fact Europe has not yet become a 
united territorial entity with a unique culture or history. Therefore, the risk is that it will still 
remain for many years doomed to be perceived as a rather detached and artificially made 
concept, not a mere identity for the countries who joined this abstract idea. The truth is, at 
present, that attempts at boycotting populism by destabilising the anti-populist programme do 
not prevent from its coming back, even by overruling its stigmatization. 
 
 
 
2.6 Populism: a debated concept 
 
In academic research there is a good amount of questions that still seek answers, such as 
the reason why populism has apparently proliferated so quickly across the world. 
 
 
8 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/3643823/Enoch-Powells-Rivers-of-Blood-speech.html 
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 Moreover, what these disparate demonstrations of populism do share or whether populism 
really constitutes a menace to democracy. And lastly, maybe the most fundamental question 
of all, what we are actually arguing when we employ the term “populism” today. The 
erudition on populism is unusually inadequate and many scholars have quit on the potential 
action of employing the term in any relevant manner. However, in the opinion of different 
left-wing scholars, populism must be classified as nothing more than a pathology that is day 
by day affecting democratic governments worldwide. This argument has been indeed 
advanced by a growing number of both experts and academics. However, it is important to 
mark a distinction between what is defined as popular and what as populist instead. In fact, 
this is exactly the reason why contemporary political scholars or populism analysts (e.g. 
Laclau, 2005) prefer avoiding attributing either a solely positive or negative association to 
populism. 
 
Needless to say, being populist has for long been (and still continues to be) perceived as a 
political stigma. Populism is a phenomenon definitely difficult to conceptualize and put in a 
single box, mostly because it is unavoidably context-dependent. Paul Taggart tried to make 
the concept of “people” clearer by introducing a term, “heartland” (2000: 96), which stands 
for an idealized understanding of the community and reveals the values and system of beliefs 
belonging to ordinary people. The heartland is grounded on emotions and sees populists 
building nostalgic recollections in an attempt to re-create what has been lost in the current 
time. The conflict, he added, is being fought between delegates of a society ready for change, 
and key actors of a divisive culture of exclusion who demands a return to a uniformed society. 
Populism is in effect able to operate as either a corrective or a threat for democracy, obtaining 
both inclusionary and exclusionary articulations (Stavrakakis, 2014: 514). Today, this 
comeback is becoming more intense and has perhaps reached its highest point with its centre 
being for the moment placed after the outburst of the financial crisis in 2008 and spatially, 
within the Eurozone, particularly in those countries that have been put under supervision like 
Greece (ibid: 505). 
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 Populism reacts amongst other things to the downfall of the electoral backing for 
politicians, the rise of electoral abstention, the electoral instability, the increasing extension of 
the political spectrum, the gradual appearance of specially-made social movements not 
represented by classic political groups, and  the creation of single-issue or radical movements. 
 
However, it should be necessary to begin at first by positioning populism within the 
changing global media scenario. The present era is one that shows a growing omnipresence 
and easy access of communication technologies, together with the unrestrained growth in the 
velocity and objectives of communication and information networks. We are well past the 
point when experts were dealing with the romantic concept of the populist speaking straight to 
the people from makeshift platforms. Modern times have been now witnessing a new type of 
sharp populist heads who know how to employ new media technologies, including the rise of 
the Internet and social networking, to their advantage (Moffitt, 2016: 1). In particular, Rocha 
utilizes the expression to make reference to a rhetorical political style intended to prepare for 
action the electorate against the power structure and whose legitimacy is basically supported 
by the people and against the elites (2012: 9). 
 
It is confirmed the term ‘populism’ is as used as abundantly contested (Roberts 2006; Barr 
2009). From several theoretical point of views belonging to social sciences, evident is an 
opening to new ways of approaching populist politics. As a matter of fact, we can appreciate 
the high incidence of the concept in recent social science research, also because “populism 
does leave an imprint on important political phenomena” (Hawkins 2010: 49). Moreover, the 
ability of populist politics to drive new forms of political commitment is particularly 
important in an era of refusal to take part in political activism such as adhesion to party 
membership (Skocpol & Williamson 2012: 197). These days, populist politics assumes a 
fundamental role in political restoration, a situation in which moral limits between groups are 
redefined and categories of ‘us’ and ‘them’ emerge (Laclau, 2005; Fella & Ruzza, 2013). 
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 Some of the questions literature has been trying to provide an answer to can be connected 
to see whether in populism we could observe an underlying unity, or does one name conceal a 
large number of unconnected tendencies (Gellner & Ionescu, 1969: 1). As Arter stated (2010: 
490), “there is general agreement in the comparative literature that populism is 
confrontational, chameleonic, culture-bound and context-dependent”. What is important now 
to comprehend is how culture and context influence populism and how populist politics in 
turn has an effect on political transformation. 
 
For what concerns the situation in Europe, a restrictive right-wing form of populism came 
to notice in the 1980s and has grown in strength concentrating their energy primarily on 
immigrants and wage dumping. There are some conceptual approaches that come to light 
within socio-political literature on the theme: they define populismas an ideology, a discursive 
style, and a form of political mobilization (Moffitt & Tormey. 2013; Pauwels, 2011). 
However, it is still important to stress that “which ideological features attach to populism 
depend upon the socio-political context within which the populist actors mobilize” (Mudde & 
Kaltwasser, 2011: 2). 
 
To categorize populism as an ideology has specific consequences on how research on the 
topic is accomplished. If populism is considered primarily as a group of ideas, it follows that 
empirical studies should mainly address their focus towards assertions made by political 
actors having a planned approach, acting upon the latter as fundamental units of analysis. 
Therefore, primary investigation in this tradition pay attention on party literature, which could 
present itself in the shape of official manifestoes or transcripted speeches so as to evaluate the 
political actors (e.g Nigel Farage) involved. On the contrary, if we take as example UKIP and 
its politics, we could observe that populism is built on the dichotomy between ‘us’ and 
‘them’, so not an ideology that registers the fundamental beliefs of the leader/political actor, 
but a certain style of political expression that is rigorously and strategically applied in a 
broader perspective by both right and left, alternative and mainstream parties. 
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 The most significant implications examine the units of analysis and levels of measurement 
employed in the investigations on populism. Targeting this concept as a discursive style 
makes it available to its operationalization as a progressive property of specific examples of 
political expression (Bos et al. 2011) rather than a basic feature of political movements and 
their respective leaders that can be caught by an uncomplicated populist/non-populist 
dichotomy, especially because political actors can mould and re-mould their rhetorical style in 
a simpler manner than their official ideology. 
 
This difference about populism, if tagged as ideology or style, is caught by Deegan-Krause 
 
& Haughton (2009: 822), who maintain that the comprehension of the term as distinguishing 
feature of political talk as preferred to an identity of political actors “shifts our assessments 
 
from binary opposition— a party is populist or not—to a matter of degree—a party has more 
populist characteristics or fewer” (Rooduijn et al. 2012). In addition, the amount of populism 
a certain political actor use may change over time and contexts, while in contrast the actor’s 
unambiguous ideological beliefs are probably supposed to be more consistent. Populism 
proves to be a form of politics rather than a constant peculiarity of political actors. Among 
distinctive characteristics, we can observe a paranoid style consisting in dramatic 
exaggeration, a tendency to suspect and catastrophic conspiracy theories. Hallmark attributed 
to the paranoid style the concern about menaces to take control of the independent nation and 
overturn its most fundamental values. For Laclau, the metaphorical separation between ‘us’ 
and ‘them’, keystone of populist discourse, constitutes an example of relational ‘empty 
signifiers’ that can compete against each other on several subjects, according to social 
context. These categories acquire significance thanks to a process of “identification”, through 
which given social groups are recognized as ‘the people’ (us) and put in competition against 
threatening ‘others’ (them). As Panizza clarifies (2005: 3), conflict is thus construed as 
method of identification in which the connection between the people/form as signifier and 
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 people/content as signified is conveyed by the naming process, that is to settle who these 
enemies of the people are and to give it a credible explanation. 
 
In differing from traditional theories, Laclau (1977) considers populism as appropriate for 
the political stage. As a matter of fact, society is separated into two battlefields, and populism 
shows up when those from “below” consult power. This is usually concurrent with moments 
of hegemony crisis, when social demands do not get acceptable resolutions from the 
institutions. The populist creation of the “people” necessitates a procedure that presents the 
plebeian as the entire populus. This creation is entrenched via hostility between two sectors of 
the society: the “people” versus the “elite”. The populist reasoning strategically encourages a 
social division by adopting favoured signifiers that frame the whole field into two 
diametrically opposed sides: for the antagonist we have the “regime”, the “oligarchy”, the 
“dominant groups”; for the abused we can observe the “people”, the “nation”, the “silent 
majority,” and so on. Since the 1970s, Laclau’s strategy has accordingly emphasised two 
pivotal aspects of all potential populist discourses, in spite of its definite political orientation 
and content: a) the mention to the signifier “the people” and its struggle against the dominant 
ideology. 
 
A few important question to ask ourselves is whether we should perceive populism only as 
a menace to liberal democratic system or a provocation that once (and if) overcome can even 
lead to a stronger stability in western democracy. Moreover, one should wonder if populism 
can be defined as a dysfunction of the democratic system, or their demands concerning 
renewal of democracy could start a salvation for elitist and a bureaucratic system which is no 
longer felt as representative by its citizens. As Cas Mudde stated, “maybe the arguments of 
populist are true and that could explain why they are so successful” (Mudde, 2004: 553). 
Notwithstanding, “a certain shapelessness in ideas and organization is inherited in populism” 
(Held, 1996: 63). It is in fact fundamental not to forget that the word “populism” originates 
from Latin “populus”, meaning “the people”, and that entails strong correlation to democracy 
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 itself. As a consequence, one could assume that where there is democracy, there is populism. 
 
(Decker, 2003). 
 
Populism is a very frequent tactic also employed by so-called “respectable” parties which 
use populism’s strategies to their benefit, but do not set a threat to constitutional democracy. 
Is it equally possible to understand populism as a social movement. It mostly arises from the 
protest of social groups, can use similar strategies, and conducts its political activity via 
petitions or referendums, which are the official channels provided by political system (Meny 
& Surel, 2002). Similarly, Crick asserted (2005: 626) that the only tool considered useful is 
direct democracy consists in referendum or elections. In sum, we cannot label populism either 
as a pure social movement, or as a political party. 
 
Eventually, it is worth mentioning that Etienne Balibar
9
 talked of a form of “positive 
populism”, that is likely to ensure the support of a vast portion of the electorate. The plan may 
well be long and certainly intricate. However, without it, revitalized belief would be 
complicated. A failure project could even expand further the relations of inequality, feeding 
popular dissatisfaction/alienation from politics thus allowing far right, old-line populism to 
present itself as the exclusive possible choice, regardless the opportunistic nature of the 
strategy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/giorgos-katsambekis-yannis-stavrakakis/populism-
anti-populism-and-european-democr 
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 Chapter 3 
 
Theoretical Framework and Methodology 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1. An Interdisciplinary Approach 
 
A study of populism solely based on one theoretical frame would not be considered 
appropriate, since it would give a monotonous and insufficient answer and exclude the context 
in which the discourse develops. Therefore, an integration of different approaches has been 
chosen in order to determine the way in which media texts are posed with the purpose to 
define an organised text analysis, to clarify their meanings and to determining the way 
discourse is involved in the media document and be adequate to provide answers to find out 
how discourse operates. That is why four main discoursal features that directly affect the 
formation of ideological patterning in editorials are here investigated: 
 
 
1. Words, phrases and sentences that reflect UKIP’s Eurosceptic ideology 
2. Lexical choices that reflect “Us” vs. “Them” 
3. Words, phrases and sentences that implicate extra meanings 
4. Polarization patterns 
 
 
 
 
One of the first quotes to underline is that discourse analysis “has become part of the 
accepted canon of approaches when analysing international politics” (Diez, 2001: 5). Critical 
Discourse Analysis is useful to unveil controlling manœuvres in politics and mass media, 
which work towards linguistic homogeneity or a discriminatory selections of humans, and to 
increase the 
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 awareness of the rhetorical strategies which are used to command in the adoption of certain 
political convictions, belief systems, and objectives. As a matter of fact, each single example 
of language has an effect on a society and its culture, and “no language use is possible without 
a social cultural background” (Tischler, 2001: 180). 
 
As a result, it follows that Critical Discourse Analysis is not confined to discourse 
operation, but has to consider cultural and societal backgrounds in addition to that. What is 
important to underline is that discourse does not occur in emptiness, it is actually set inside a 
definite context. For that reason, a discourse cannot be inferred without acknowledging its 
specific background. This theme is essential in pragmatics and originally theorised by 
Wittgenstein. The latter asserted that utterances acquire signification exclusively in 
circumstantial, cultural and historical context (Wodak, 1996: 19). According to this 
interpretation, CDA assigns a key role to context analysis, as well as intertextuality has a 
prominent function because of the importance of past and present discourses in the CDA 
perspective. 
 
Within the tradition of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), strong attention is paid to the 
crucial role political élite plays in the production, diffusion and legitimisation of racist 
discourse through time. Norman Fairclough (1999) and Ruth Wodak (2008) have set up 
techniques of Critical Discourse Analysis to penetrate the language of common sense 
discrimination. Furthermore, Fairclough describes CDA as dismantling the political 
employment of narratives for electoral politics on a “terrain of hegemonic structure” (1998: 
145). 
 
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is holistic by combining several branches of learning. It 
consists of a number of various theoretical strategies to the micro-level analysis of text and 
talk that concerns the social and/or political context. These disparate methodological 
strategies are gathered, however, by a macrolevel social analysis which asserts that social 
inequality may be instituted, supported and authorized through elite language use, discourse 
(Hart, 2009: 106). 
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 Social reality, according to Pandey, is frequently depicted in dichotomous terms, a 
juxtaposition of Us versus Them (2004: 155). Moreover, he maintains that “Othering” is a 
specific word employed to define the way social group divisions are expressed via language. 
Generally, for the Critical Linguist, it is in and between linguistic preferences that writers 
encrypt their meaning position, that is, their critical position. For that reason, for the critical 
linguist (see Fairclough, 1994), the connection between language and the social distinction 
reproduced in this kind of language is personal and bi-directional. 
 
A few research questions raised in this case study will need the support of a multifaceted 
critical approach: 
 
• How does UKIP linguistically legitimise a politics of exclusion? 
 
• What are the dynamics that govern the party’s political/rhetorical strategies 
 
The framework of ideas of analysis being used in this study comes from the arena of 
Critical Discourse Analysis combining several branches of learning, whose dominant priority 
is the study of “the intricate relationships between text, talk, social cognition, power, society 
and culture” (van Dijk, 1993: 253). That kind of technique assesses the extent to which social 
beliefs and impressions are reproduced and supported in the small structures of text, words 
and expressions, and the degree to which language as employed by politicians helps express 
and support social imbalances. Therefore, CDA reveals to be useful to unveil controlling 
manœuvres in politics and mass media, which work towards linguistic homogeneity or a 
discriminatory selections of humans, and to increase the awareness of the rhetorical strategies 
which are used to command in the adoption of certain political convictions, belief systems, 
and objectives. 
Given the multidisciplinarity of CDA, a blend of approaches can be appropriate to critical 
analysis of texts. In addition, a combination of different approaches would be very important 
in order to achieve an acceptable form of multidisciplinary CDA. 
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 British immigration discourse is considerably a discourse of doubt and constantly growing 
concern, as well as xenophobia and hostility, affecting a steady Self–Other discrimination and 
coordinated processes of othering. It depends on discursively created threat and fear 
generation systems, such as proximization, which perform a coercive function (Cap, 2016: 
14). Proximization Theory, developed by Cap (2013: 294), is described as a “new cognitive-
pragmatic development designed to account for strategic regularities underlying forced 
construals in political discourse.” Proximization Theory evokes the closeness of the external 
threats to ask for people’s consent. Fundamentally, the alien Outside Deictic Centre (ODC) 
crosses the space to invade the home territory identified by the Inside Deictic Centre (IDC). 
From this point of view, Discourse Space peripheral entities (the economic migrants) are 
unifying physically and sometimes overlapping upon the Discourse Space central entities (the 
speaker, the addressees). 
 
A different construction of the nation, which is interestingly meaningful for immigration 
discourse, entails metaphors through which the nation is conceptualised as a house (Chilton, 
1994). According to Werth (1999), where mental spaces are the theoretical constructions 
which encourage the discourse process, a discourse space is a representation of the “narrative” 
created in the discourse - the “text world”. Following again Chilton (2004: 58), it is 
 
 
“not that we can actually measure the “distances‟ from Self; rather, the idea is that people tend to 
place people and things along a scale of remoteness from the self, using background assumptions and 
indexical cues.” 
 
 
 
  
The analysis of Farage’s Euroscepticism will be placed under such a multi-layered 
analytical perspective (communication, political science and linguistics). However, I will 
focus on apparently harmless and neutral discourse, which undergoes a CDA “dissection 
procedure” dominated by the pivotal presence of Us vs. Them Polarization in constructing 
ideological discourses: 
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CDA 
 
US vs Them Ingroup/Outgroup Epistemic/ Deontic Proximization 
 Constructions Modality Theory 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Metaphor is a specific variety of linguistic manifestation which inspires the construction of a 
certain number of mental spaces. Following Hart and Lukes (2009: 109) in the metaphor 
example, mental spaces constructed during discourse endure a precise conceptual mixing 
operation whereby they are blended in an incorporated network, manufacturing inferential 
structure. That being said, metaphor is a linguistic and conceptual characteristic of certain 
importance for Critical Discourse Analysis. 
 
It is in this way that Discourse Space Theory probably presume mental space theory: the 
deictic centre is the secure point of the discourse event, where speakers are situated as a 
logical consequence.  
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 3.2 CDA and Rhetoric 
 
The awareness that language and politics are elaborately intertwined has been 
indispensable to rhetoric studies and many fronts of discourse research, Critical Discourse 
Analysis in particular. As a matter of fact, rhetoric is still adopted as an analytical approach 
for the investigation of texts in both classical and contemporary forms, and this procedure 
includes political speeches (for instance). On the other hand, however, there have been 
requests for academics to a great extent to better examine the benefits that both rhetoric and 
discourse analysis obtain if employed together in an interdisciplinary way. It would be not 
inaccurate, I would say, that rhetoric combined with CDA can spotlight both the persuasion 
and power distinctions behind a speech, a manifesto or a newspaper article. 
 
Critical methods applied to discourse have been used indeed to investigate variety of 
discourses, and they acquire a relevant role in relation to political studies. If we think about 
the development of political structures, where single entities need to be influenced to 
cooperate to the benefit of all, it seems to count on the employment of a system based on 
symbolic communication. What is certain is that the power of rhetoric, the declamatory ability 
of language manipulation for persuasive intentions, was perfectly understood in classical 
times. Rhetorical language, as well politics, is evidently not always sincere. For this reason, it 
may be employed to conceal or misrepresent the truth in the same way. As a consequence, 
political rhetoric is fabricated to guide its public to a pathway of definite thoughts, 
assumptions and eventual reaction. The aim for politicians is not primarily to present facts, 
but to be persuasive (Kazemian & Hashemi, 2014: 1180). 
 
For what concerns this case study, I will highlight the accurate strategy in which Nigel 
Farage, by inflaming the wistful and nationalistic fire in the ‘virtual’ or real crowd, 
successfully uses the polemic allure of pathos. This dodge can be compared to Aristotle’s 
concept of emotions, since Farage provokes discontent or even animosity in the crowd by 
 referring to the three hot topics well-known by now: immigration, anti-establishment and EU. 
In fact, Aristotle argued that if an item has importance, people will get angry in the end.1 
 
So, we will see in the next chapter the way it works UKIP/Farage’s rhetoric - specifically 
on lexical items suitable for persuasion - interlinked with the CDA approach, which works on 
those linguistic elements aimed at the exercise of power. 
 
 
3.3 Corpus Collection and Composition 
 
The corpus collection analysed for the present study is made up of three sections, where 
Farage explains the reasons why the UK should withdraw from the EU and vote to leave 
Europe in the Brexit Referendum: 1) UKIP electoral manifestos (2005-2015); 2) online 
editorials (2015-2016); 3) speeches (2015-2016). 
 
The then UKIP leader has maintained that the authentic concerns of voters have always 
been swept under the carpet and never discussed. Explanatory examples can be found from 
the developments towards immigration-centred discourse in manifestos besides Nigel 
Farage’s public declarations. These daring declarations are proclaimed in the midst of local 
elections and largely in advance of the European Parliament elections in 2014 and the general 
election of 2015, all of which definitely brought satisfying results due to UKIP’s unexpected 
 
 
 
                                                     
10 See http://www.european-rhetoric.com/ethos-pathos-logos-modes-persuasion-aristotle/ 
 growth in the British political terrain and increasing appreciation among the wider public 
regarding the party as well as growing feeling of apprehension and turmoil within the country. 
 
Immigration, for instance, is a considerable segment of Farage’s discourse, in which he 
asserts that immigration “is the biggest single issue facing this country” and has an effect on 
many other difficult tests facing Britain. 
 
These tests, all associated to immigration, help Nigel Farage to build up notions of the self 
and other. This refusal by main politicians to give attention to left-behind voters interests has 
left a political gap the anti-establishment party pledges to fill, and promises given to the 
electors with UKIP will be kept. Farage indeed breaks former codes of presidential discourse 
and knowledge. In that, he dimmed traditional interactions between “discursive genre and 
socio-pragmatic function in the public sphere”. Moreover, he practically questioned the 
connections between “linguistic standards and the legitimacy of political authority,” defying 
in this manner “boundaries normally taken as stable and well-defined by traditional socio-
political and sociolinguistic orders” (Doerr & Lee, 2013: 33). 
 
From a general point of view related to previous political experiences, the far-right has 
been considered competent to craft a narrative, based on nationalism, xenophobia, and 
chauvinism, elements who are strongly understood with the public elite “them”, where the 
elites are emblem of all problems, we can appreciate in the upcoming corpus analysis. 
 
 
 
 
3.4 The role of British Media in Nationalist Populism 
 
It is fundamental not to omit that of the approximately 30 million readers of a daily 
newspaper in Britain, three-quarters read papers (mostly tabloids) that are firmly resolved to 
make British citizens dislike the EU. In fact, tabloids and/or popular newspapers are more 
persuasive than quality newspapers to share the anti-establishment stance in force in populist 
parties, and they have a particular inclination to ‘customize’ politics. Popular press is implied 
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 to deal with themes of direct relevance to ordinary people, in order to show off an anti-elite 
prejudice and concentrate on contrast and drama. In this perspective, the popular press is 
considered capable of offering an advantageous discursive opportunity framework for populist 
parties by addressing the political influence of tabloids and sensationalised communication, 
where at the same time rivals and defenders tend to associate tabloids with populist politics. In 
addition, by giving strong attention to excessive drama, infotainment, rants and anti-elitism, 
tabloids are supposed to provide a platform for populist (counter) politics (Sparks & Tulloch, 
2000). Both popular press and populist movements share comparable expressive styles. 
Anyway, the existence of a widespread circulation does not preserve tabloids from 
competition with huge media such as television. As a matter of fact, it has been argued that 
these tabloid-quality ranges from “exclusive attention to sports, scandal and popular 
entertainment in the true tabloid to exclusive attention to politics, economics and society in 
the ideal quality newspaper” (Sparks & Tulloch, 2000: 11). Common view asserts that 
popular newspapers concentrate more on local crime and immigration than quality 
newspapers. In the end, tabloids share an anti-establishment position with populist parties and 
a strong orientation against elites while exhibiting proximity to the people. Quality 
newspapers, on the other hand, are inclined to be more aligned with the status quo and 
supportive of political elites (Mazzoleni et al., 2003: 8). 
 
The ownership of the UK print media is similarly well-delimited. There are four newspaper 
groups – the Daily Mail and papers controlled by Rupert Murdoch (The Sun and The Times), 
Richard Desmond (The Express and The Star) and the Barclay brothers (The Daily Telegraph) 
– possess about 75 per cent of daily newspapers sold, and generally dictate a strictly 
Eurosceptic policy on their journalists. Those circumstances have been fertile ground for anti-
EU propaganda over many years, having profoundly pervaded into Britain’s political culture, 
and have provided a major contribution to the swing in British public opinion since the late 
1980s, since the country has become more Eurosceptic (Grant, 2008: 6). 
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 3.5 Three Discourse Genres of Political Communication in UKIP 
 
Populist parties such as UKIP frequently embrace political platforms that diverge from 
their more mainstream antagonists, and analysing their specific versions of political truth 
should confirm illuminating (Røren & Todd, 2014: 24). Volosinov (1973) suggests the 
presence of an organised set of discourses defined as processes which are cohesive 
organisations-of-content: “each period and each social group has had and has its own 
repertoire of speech forms for ideological communication in human behaviour. Each set of 
cognate forms, i.e., each behavioural speech genre, has its own corresponding set of themes". 
In this occasion, I will focus on three main styles of political genre which will perfectly blend 
in the corpus analysis we will see in the forthcoming chapter. However, I find significant to 
here specify the material collected for my research study and the more or less evident 
peculiarities of each one, just because the analysis will work for an harmonisation in order to 
focus on the three main issues concerning UKIP ideology and the Brexit campaign. 
 
 
 
3.6 Election Manifestos 
 
According to the Oxford dictionary, a manifesto refers to 
 
 
 
 
A public declaration or proclamation, written or spoken; esp. a printed declaration, explanation, or 
justification of policy issued by a head of state, government, or political party or candidate, or any 
other individual or body of individuals of public relevance, as a school or movement in the Arts. 
 
 
 
 
Election manifestos play a significant function in British campaigning. Their printing, 
which in contemporary times has frequently been combined with massive media distribution, 
supports an archive of "authoritative statements of what the party plans to do in government" 
(Dale, 2000: 7). In most cases, manifestos can also hit a popular emotion, as in Labour's 1945 
and 1964 manifestos which pledged "social and economic reconstruction" and "modernisation 
of the economy" respectively (Kavanagh 2000: 7). In addition, by way of 
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 their textual prominence, manifestos often establish the aspect and arguments of discourse in 
campaign, and they are employed as a starting point by the party and/or its political 
adversaries after elections, and by the media also to corroborate that their promises have been 
realized, or to declare that they have not been honoured. The influence and authority observed 
in this type of written communication has no comparison. This is the reason why there is no 
wonder manifestos have drawn the attention of discourse analysis’ academics inclined to 
politics (see Pearce 2004, Edwards, 2012). 
 
In this study, we will investigate UKIP’s populism by drawing discourse samples from 
their manifestos (collected from 2005 to 2015). 
 
 
 Date  Title N. Pages 
     
200511  We Want our 8 
  Country Back  
     
2010 Empowering the People 16 
     
2014 Create an Earthquake 8 
  (European Parliament elections)  
     
2015 Believe in Britain 76 
     
Table 1: UKIP Manifestos 2005-2015 
 
 
The first thing to stress is the considerable amount of effort invested into campaigning. As 
a matter of fact, a crucial element of campaigning is the adoption of manifestos to delineate in 
detail the concept and models of a political group. Models of democracy are set inside 
liability. A manifesto indeed serves as a significant criterion for evaluating the efficiency of a 
government, assuring furthermore its responsibility to voters with attention to the programs 
and promises conceived in the text. Manifestos have been for a very long time an 
indispensable script of political management, since significant references of information relate 
to a party's position on an ample sphere of advancing arguments. It would be reasonable to 
 
 
11 Back in the days, Roger Knapman was the leader. 
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 keep in mind though that, in an attempt to obtain power, manifestos may usually include high 
standards and impractical programs. The limits between politics and national ambitions are 
becoming unfocused in several manifestos being published. It is important not to forget a 
manifesto is a meaningful document deserving analysis in a democratic environment. 
However, it may also be plausible to affirm that when programs for development assume 
political hues, it becomes hard for subsequent governments to look for recognition of their 
reasons by employing the ideals preserved in a text, even if the topic treated had an 
encompassing subject of national importance. 
 
Election manifestos propose the concepts and principles of parties concurrently, at a 
specific time point. Following Budge (1994), manifestos are produced on a regular basis, and 
this tendency makes them an important source to research position shifts over time (Laver & 
Garry, 2000). The first element to highlight is how distinct is the widespread presence of 
promotional language and market-influenced vocabulary into the field of manifesto writing. 
Moreover, the employment of metaphors seem to be the instrument for the creation of the 
party image pictured through the manifestos. A restricted generic information can also be 
constructed from the outcomes founded on the structure and the ideas contained in the 
manifestos. One hypothesis is that there is a given structure basically followed by any 
manifesto and, therefore, it could be possible to enlarge specific descriptions to include an 
area which could be defined as the genre of political manifestos. In particular, generic 
outcomes such as the use of the exclusive ‘we’, the absence of certain basic parts of argument 
structure, the adoption of the future tense and the present progressive feature can provide to 
the definition of the genre of manifesto writing. 
 
What is also important is that different question areas – which may interest aspect such as 
immigration, economy, welfare and Europe - are organised under a subheading which will 
present the topic area. This subheading delineates one definite group of policy where details 
and goals are elucidated. Most certainly, they would not consist in an explicit “Vote for us”, 
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 since the electorate is able to implicitly realise that this is the function of these category of 
texts. However, their “manufacturing” is not for sale as we can observe in promotional 
writing: what they –seek to - sell is an ideology, their own vision of the world, and an ideal 
society that can be realised via voting the party into power (Savola, 2008: 111). 
 
 
 
3.6.1 The Genre of Online Editorials 
 
I will take into account in this study a number of online editorials by Nigel Farage that 
attempt to mobilise people by relying on planned controlling strategies in order to determine 
the way media documents are presented. The editorials were all collected during Brexit 
campaign, which is to say from July 2015 until June 2016. 
 
 
Date Tabloid/Quality Title Tokens 
 Press   
    
31/07/2015 Farage for Breitbart It’s time to start the EU 653 
  Referendum fight  
    
09/08/2015 Farage for Breitbart Calais Chaos will get worse 482 
  rather then better  
    
18/09/2015 Farage for Breitbart The EU Juggernaut uses the 677 
  migrant crisis to expand  
  powers  
    
04/10/2015 Farage for Breitbart Universities are rife with 793 
  EU propaganda. Join my  
  campaign against it  
    
11/10/2015 Farage for Breitbart Hollande and Merkel come 812 
  to Srasbourg, and more on  
  the ‘Leave’ Campaign  
    
16/10/2015 Farage for Breitbart The Turkey-EU migrant 643 
  deal verges of ‘Insanity’. A  
  new tides awaits Britain  
    
26/10/2015 Farage for Breitbart Government green 853 
  commitments means energy  
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  double price germans  
    
08/11/2015 Farage for Breitbart Why does Barack Obama’s 890 
  White House hate the  
  United Kingdom  
    
13/11/2015 Farage for Breitbart Europe can’t put the migrant 761 
  champagne cork back in the  
  open border bottles  
    
26/11/2015 Farage for Breitbart Need For A Robust, 771 
  Flexible and Value For  
  Money. UK Defence  
  Industry Is More Critical  
  Than Ever.  
    
06/12/2015 Farage for Breitbart After Oldham, I’m Adding 899 
  Voting Reform to my  
  Bucket List  
    
10/12/2015 Farage for Breitbart UK Universities Hotbeds Of 766 
  EU Propaganda – Stories  
  From Breitbart Readers…  
    
20/12/2015 Farage for Breitbart UK Migration Cover Up: 774 
  The Government Must  
  Release The REAL Figures  
  Immediately  
    
31/12/2015 Farage for Breitbart Brussels Is Targeting UK 777 
  Fishermen Like Me, And  
  The UK Papers Ignore It  
    
12/01/2016 Farage for Breitbart Pan-European Migrant Rape 724 
  Story Response Highlights.  
  The Continent’s  
  Unconditional Surrender  
    
17/01/2016 Farage for Breitbart Cameron Fiddles While EU 696 
  Plans Massive Power Grab  
    
22/01/2016 Farage for Breitbart Labour Think Its ‘Racist’ 808 
  To Blame The Cologne  
  Attacks On Migrants  
    
05/02/2016 Farage for Breitbart ‘Vote Leave’ Campaign Are 346 
  Talking About A ‘Double  
  Referendum’ – We Can’t  
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  Allow It  
    
13/02/2016 Farage for Breitbart Why for the first time in 29 691 
  Question Time appearances  
  I applauded another member  
  of the panel  
    
29/02/2016 Farage for Breitbart Hurrah For Boris! The 854 
  ‘Double Referendum’ Idea  
  Must Surely Now Be Dead  
    
13/03/2016 Farage for Breitbart The SNP Is NOT A 517 
  Nationalist Party, And  
  That’s Why They’ll  
  Campaign To Give Scotland  
  To The EU  
    
20/03/2016 Farage for Breitbart Is Cameron REALLY 534 
  Going To Get A ‘Victory’  
  On The Tampon Tax? Don’t  
  Be So Sure…  
    
05/04/2016 Farage for Breitbart The Unseen Referendum: 704 
  Tomorrow’s Netherlands’  
  Litmus Test On The  
  European Union  
    
10/04/2016 Farage for Breitbart The Designation Is This 548 
  Week… Now Let’s Unite  
  And Fight!  
    
22/04/2016 Farage for Breitbart Let’s Get Real: Would 674 
  Obama Unconditionally  
  Open Borders To Mexico  
  As We’ve Done With The  
  EU? No Chance!  
    
15/05/2016 Farage for Breitbart The Immigration Figures 453 
  Scandal Shows How  
  Powerless We Are Inside  
  The EU  
    
29/05/2016 Farage for Breitbart Hidden Plans EU Army 649 
  command center leaked  
  ahead Brexit vote  
    
01/06/2016 Farage for Breitbart Leave Tories. Now back 392 
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   UKIP Immigration Policies.  
  This means we can win.  
    
05/06/2015 The Telegraph Join my campaign to leave 833 
  the EU and get our country  
  back  
    
16/06/2015 The Telegraph It is 'bonkers' to stay in the 944 
  European Union  
    
06/07/2015 The Telegraph Greece votes No: The 597 
  European Union is dying  
  before our eyes  
    
14/07/2015 The Telegraph We will all be like Greece if 1036 
  the EU gets its way  
    
29/10/2015 The Telegraph Britain will be flattened if it 751 
  stays in the EU  
    
02/12/2015 The Telegraph Ukip will wipe out Labour 922 
  in the north – just as the  
  SNP did in Scotland  
    
06/04/2016 The Telegraph The Dutch referendum 565 
  shows how the internet is  
  taking back power from our  
  Europhile elites  
    
05/06/2015 Express.co.uk Farage on Friday: EU 591 
  referendum a chance to  
  create a better Britain for  
  future generations  
    
12/06/2015 Express.co.uk Farage on Friday: There's 505 
  little doubt UKIP is the most  
  demonised party in Britain  
    
19/06/2015 Express.co.uk Farage on Friday: David 615 
  Cameron is whistling in the  
  wind with pitiful EU reform  
  attempts  
    
03/07/2015 Express.co.uk Farage on Friday: The EU 326 
  does NOT care about what  
  is best for Greece  
    
18/07/2015 Express.co.uk Farage on Friday: Britain 954 
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   would not only survive but  
  THRIVE out of the EU  
    
31/07/2015 Express.co.uk Farage on Friday: We need 363 
  to be less frightened of  
  France to tackle Calais  
  chaos  
    
21/08/2015 Express.co.uk Farage on Friday: The day 452 
  of reckoning is coming for  
  Greece and the European  
  Union  
    
25/09/2015 Express.co.uk Together we can free 905 
  ourselves from the EU's  
  shackles, says Ukip leader  
  NIGEL FARAGE  
    
10/10/2015 Express.co.uk EU's “come one, come all” 307 
  is causing an exodus of  
  biblical proportions, says  
  Farage  
    
30/10/2015 Express.co.uk Nigel Farage: It's 418 
  official...Britain’s  
  population surge is  
  TOTALLY out of control  
    
15/12/2015 Express.co.uk 'The tide has turned' Nigel 400 
  Farage says poll shows  
  British public want OUT of  
  the EU  
    
29/12/2015 Express.co.uk Fishing farce shows why we 439 
  must vote to leave EU  
    
03/02/2016 Express.co.uk Farage slams PM for 'utter 443 
  surrender' to EU dictatorship  
    
08/02/2016 Express.co.uk Nigel Farage: It costs £55 770 
  MILLION a day to be an  
  EU member – and for what?  
    
11/02/2016 Express.co.uk Britain must leave the EU 480 
  and control own borders,  
  says Nigel Farage  
    
26/02/2016 Express.co.uk Nigel Farage: Debate 326 
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   Britain's broken borders  
  with me, Theresa May  
    
27/04/2016 Express.co.uk The EU's green ambitions 435 
  have cost thousands of jobs  
  in the UK, says Nigel  
  Farage  
    
11/05/2016 Express.co.uk Nigel Farage's EU diary: 466 
  'Leave campaign MUST  
  woo Labour voters to win  
  referendum'  
    
18/05/2016 Express.co.uk Farage’s EU diary: Time to 310 
  liven up the debate  
    
22/05/2016 Express.co.uk Turkey joining the EU 305 
  would be a total disaster for  
  Britain, says Nigel Farage  
    
01/06/2016 Express.co.uk Stop migrants trying to 277 
  reach Britain by boat or face  
  more chaos, says Nigel  
  Farage  
    
21/06/2016 Express.co.uk Nigel Farage: Why we must 1046 
  vote LEAVE in the EU  
  referendum  
    
20/10/2015 UKIP This Referendum is not 230 
  about leaving Europe. It is  
  about our EU membership  
    
10/11/2015 UKIP Nigel Farage responds to the 88 
  Prime Minister's speech on  
  the EU  
    
12/04/2016 UKIP Farage calls out the IMF - 282 
  It's only protecting its own  
  as it always does  
    
03/05/2016 UKIP Farage and Boris clear 284 
  favourites to represent  
  Leave in TV debates  
    
09/05/2016 UKIP UKIP Leader Nigel Farage 166 
  responds to the PM's EU  
  speech  
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26/05/2016 UKIP UKIP response to latest 364 
   immigration figures  
      
19/04/2016 The Sun THIS is how we should 595 
   control our borders, says  
   Ukip leader Nigel Farage  
      
20/06/2016 Mirror Britain should be a proper 409 
   democracy and the only way  
   that can happen is Brexit  
      
Table 2: Online editorials by Nigel Farage (July 2015-June 2016) 
 
 
Apparently, online versions of newspapers present the use of language which is fresh, 
topical and current. The purpose is to develop a systematic analysis of the texts, understanding 
their meaning and determining the level of implication of discourse in media texts and be 
capable of providing interpretation as to why and in which manner discourse operates. 
Following Van Dijk (2006), since “manipulation is usually discursive, and involves power 
abuse, it should be studied by Critical Discourse Analysis”. It is therefore a calculated 
discourse that is mainly conveyed to foment people having determined reactions functional to 
the writer’s political doctrine. Ideology, in fact, has a fundamental role in taking people to the 
same field of national support and of opposing, insulting and blaming the ‘Other’. For the 
academic, in addition, manipulation is studied through a triangular methodology: social, 
cognitive and discursive. Eventually, it will be significant the effect of lexical choices in 
finely nuanced persuasion and the relevance of schematic organization of editorial discourse 
(Scollon, 1998). 
 
 
 
3.6.2 Political Speeches 
 
As Schäffner affirms, in political discourse “political speech analysis can be successful 
when it relates the details of linguistic behaviour to political behaviour” (1996: 202). As a 
consequence, reading the surface of political speech may not make the speaker’s purpose 
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 obvious. With the lack of awareness about context and discourse, people may only be able to 
comprehend his/her speech in a micro-level perspective. 
 
UKIP political speeches by Nigel Farage were recorded during the above mentioned Say 
No to Europe Tour from September 2015 to March 2016 and posted online. For the purposes 
of this study, eight speeches were transcribed, as reported below: 
 
 
Date City Tokens 
   
06/09/2015 Yeovil 3207 
   
14/09/2015 Belfast 5785 
   
12/10/2015 Gateshead 4262 
   
23/10/2015 Swansea 3341 
   
20/11/2015 London 4157 
   
27/11/2015 Basingtoske 4113 
   
16/03/2016 Peterborough 4120 
   
18/03/2016 Bath 3200 
   
Table 3: Political Speeches by Nigel Farage (September 2015-March 2016) 
 
 
Speeches can be used to question or strengthen dominant cultural, political and beliefs. 
According to Uvehammer (2005), the primary intention of political speech is to persuade the 
audience of the public speaker by selecting the most influential linguistic instruments. Thorne 
(1997) asserts that a good quantity of people hold to be true that language manipulates 
thought. Therefore, from the moment language is manipulated, so are the real mechanisms of 
thought. It follows that when the listeners feel that their opinions are accepted and sustained, 
the speaker instituted linkage to the principles that they aspire to communicate. 
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 CHAPTER 4 
 
Populism as Discourse 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1 Investigating the Two Sides of a Message 
 
A key element to keep in mind when investigating a (nat)populist discourse is that a 
populist party has a dissenting and opposing message on purpose, often alleged to be 
alongside the working class while deprecating the commonly named ‘elites’ of society who 
are operating against their interests. This way, these parties are believed to be profiting from 
the dissatisfaction of the general public for political gain (Betz, 1993). In addition, the fact 
that populists feel certain to have an autonomous powerbase means that they feel entitled to 
react to elite anger not by retracing their steps or showing diffidence, but with provocation 
and indeed accentuation of their first observation. Furthermore, for the reason they are not 
aspiring to impress the ‘best people’, the language they employ could be easily defined as 
direct, straightforward and without nuance. 
 
A considerable number of scholars have noticed that right-wing populist parties’ leaders 
are more inclined to state hostility opinions through a rhetoric of exclusion, *which is 
ingrained not only in the explicit but also in the latent language they use (Riggins, 1997; 
Wodak, 2003). As expected a good part of discourse remains unspoken, and this kind of latent 
information may be figured out by the addressees from shared knowledge or mental outlooks 
and thus created as part of their mental models of the event or action represented in the 
discourse (van Dijk, 2000). 
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 As a matter of fact, metaphors and other figures of speech are not infrequently used by 
politicians in political communication as instruments to help people to make sense out of the 
political sphere (Edelman, 1964). 
 
In view of that, I will display in this chapter, through a merely qualitative content analysis, 
how both clear and hidden language is adopted to communicate hostility stances and their 
outstanding features. Nonetheless, this multi-genre inter/multi-disciplinary corpus analysis 
will disclose an atmosphere saturated with skepticism and doubt that various contemporary 
studies have recognised this mood to constitute an increasing aspect of advanced neoliberal 
societies. This discourse investigation will seek to uncover the way a speech, an editorial or a 
manifesto exploited the precariousness and worries of those Farage and UKIP claimed to 
represent the “ordinary, decent people” of the post-industrial North-East, South-West, Wales 
and eastern coastal depressed peripheries, so much confined by the global market economy 
they were desperately looking for scapegoats. And a supplier. 
 
 
4.1.1 In-Group Favouritism and the Negative Other 
 
 
 
 
The UKIP party in general and their Leave campaign especially self-styled themselves as a 
“people’s revolution”, ready to “take back control” from oppressive, yet distant, elites (Smith, 
2016: 64). 
 
 
(Us vs. Them) Polarization; Derogation; National Self-Glorification 
 
 
1)”The EU’s (them) open borders make (us) less safe. As a bureaucratic club (them) it makes (us) poorer. 
Membership of this union stops us acting in our own national interest, forcing (us) to be represented by 
unelected old men in Brussels” 
 
2) “And our weakness, the weakness of our leaders has actually allowed in our country the creation of a 
parallel society. “ (Basingstoke 16/10/2015) 
 
3) «And actually what we’ve seen from our political leaders, in this case a radical Islam, is we have seen 
 
appeasement, we have seen gutlessness, we have seen a total failure of leadership. » (Basingstoke 16/10/2015)  
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 4)”David Cameron (them) is one of the biggest cheerleaders in the whole Europe for full Turkish 
membership of EU” (Express 21/06/2016) 
 
5) “This is yet another example of how our own citizens (us) are once again suffering due to the foolish 
stupidity of the pro-EU political class (them)”. (Express 11/02/2016) 
 
6) ”Frankly (plain speaking), it is not strong to say that we’ve (us) actually been betrayed by our political class 
(them) who in the name of us, of telling a betrayal agreement, have given away our birthright…” 
 
7) “We have to reach out way beyond Westminster and in particular reach people who generally do not vote 
at all. For them, the arguments that most are likely to convince are about pride in our country and the total 
necessity to control our borders.” (Breitbart 09/10/2015) 
 
CDA inspects the power relations, ideological manipulations, and hegemony (Rahimi & 
Sahragard, 2007: 1). As a significantly influential academic research, it has stressed the fact 
that beliefs manipulations are articulated, executed, maintained and, sometimes, indoctrinated 
through discursive frameworks. According to van Dijk (1983: 10), macro-strategies like the 
negative other-representation that are strictly bound with Polarization and Us vs. Them have 
turned out to be very detailed criteria for the assessment of certain political positions. On a 
micro-level, it comprises of course language and discourse. Us – them polarization was one of 
the most widespread methods of ideological manipulation in UKIP politics: it reflects the 
conflict between us – oppressed nation and them– the supranational power detained by the 
European Union based in Brussels. Us-them polarization we can see, for instance, in “The 
EU’s open borders make us less safe”, reveals the existence of particular antagonistic 
ideologies that groups generate and employ for recognizing and identifying themselves within 
the organisation of societal structures and affiliations. Conflicts between us and them in 
sentences like “we’ve actually been betrayed by our political class”, serve also as a method of 
self-determination and identity making. 
 
Nationalistic energies have been relighted thanks to a compelling rhetorical combination of 
nostalgia, resentments and imagined destiny (Parry, 2016: 63). Analytical classifications such 
as national self-glorification constitute the schemes adopted for positive self-presentation. 
Positive references are usually employed to praise for their own country, its values, history 
and fundamentals. In other words “our own national interest”. Sonia Roccas and her 
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 colleagues have currently perfected this distinction into a more largely suitable scale that 
distinguishes between in-group connection (related to patriotism) and in-group glorification 
(related to nationalism) (Roccas et al. 2006: 698). That means the more in-group glorification, 
the more apology for the misconducts, and the less guilt (Castano & Sorolla, 2007: 810). 
 
 
In political discourse, derogatory words are part of the semantic component of any 
language to reach specific responses from the audience. For what concerns the semantic 
macro-strategy of derogation of out-group, it necessary to highlight it is a semantic device to 
deemphasise (van Dijk, 2000). In fact, the process of derogation may entail prejudiced 
opinions such as in the phrase “by unelected old men in Brussels” and ideological conflict. 
Derogation have been largely used for materialising the primary ideological purpose of 
Negative Other Representation vs. Positive Self-Representation. Farage shows political 
subjects on a spontaneous platter by downgrading his political enemies (cf. de Vreese, 2007: 
274). This stratagem, quite noticeable in “the biggest cheerleader in the whole Europe” – 
referred to former PM David Cameron - frequently confirms to be valid and profitable when 
he is affecting the delicate issue of political frustration not only among companion politicians, 
but also among the elective public. It is important not to overlook that the characterisation of 
Cameron as a cheerleader discloses how much British politicians are portrayed as eunuchs – 
“gutlessness” - according to the former UKIP leader, completely enslaved to a German-
European bureaucracy. Nonetheless, the characteristics associated with men in western culture 
(grouped under the term ‘traditional masculinity’ by many writers) combine to form an active 
role, as opposed to the typically passive qualities often associated with females (see “our 
(their) weakness, the weakness of our leaders”). Moreover, by seeking to gain scores with 
voters being disillusioned with mainstream-politics, politically indifferent ones and the 
‘decent’ people, Farage’s plan of a straightforward and offensive language to obtain approval 
might actually result extremely effective 
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 Another efficient strategy noticeable in Farage’s Brexit campaign is the one of 
“victimisation”, in which ‘the people’ are presented as the unfairly expiatory victims enduring 
the repercussions of the political elite’s false decisions (Lee, 2006: 363). Telling bad stories 
about nations such in the examples “open borders make (us) less safe. As a bureaucratic club 
(them) it makes (us) poorer” or blaming “for full Turkish membership of EU”, constitute 
methods to focus on their bad nature and represent the consequence of in-groups and out-
groups in polarization. 
 
 
4.1.2 Repetitions 
 
Repetition is a frequent tool in political rhetoric. It consists in the repetition of the same 
word or group of words at the start of various subsequent sentences, to underline an image or 
theory, or to persuade the reader or audience. As a matter of fact, politicians regularly use it to 
stimulate audiences or readers to keep in mind critical features of their speeches. Repetition 
has an effect of accretion and insistence, therefore it focuses and emphasizes on what the 
speaker needs his audience to remember (Chimbarange et als.2013: 282): 
 
8) Our message in last June’s euro-election was simple: SAY NO to European Union. But we also say NO to 
the culture of paperwork, performance tar gets and spin, NO to uncontrolled immigration, NO to a society in 
which everything is regulated and dissent is suppressed by fear and political correctness. (2005 Manifesto, R. 
Knapman) 
 
9) “Outside the EU, we can manage our borders and decide who we want to come and live and work in the 
UK. EU rules stop us from doing this. Reducing Fuel Poverty: Outside the EU, we can abolish EU laws that 
 
add hundreds of pounds to household energy bills.” (Euro Manifesto 2014) 
 
10)“So I get why big companies, I get why big business and in many ways I get why big politics likes the 
European Union.” 
 
11)“You know, look in your passport. Look in your passport. Apart for the fact it has changed colour 
everybody used to be, one of the two words on the British passport it says European Union. And that passport is 
now held by four-hundred eighty-five million people and any one of them at any time has the ability and free 
access to come to our country.” 
 
12)“But to make sure that we can win this Referendum and to hand on our children and grandchildren the 
liberties and freedom that we were born into and wish to maintain. We can win this Referendum, we can beat the 
establishment.” (Swansea 23/10/2015) 
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 13)” And I had planned, I had planned to ask him who the hell he thought he was, of why anybody have ever 
voted for him, and why we didn’t have the power to remove him, and why he was being payed more money than 
Obama.” (Belfast 14/09/2015) 
 
14) “We will work with anybody, we will share platform with anybody. We will do whatever it takes, we want 
our country back, we don’t want to stay members of the European Union and we recognized and understand that 
we won’t win this Referendum unless we get significant numbers of people from the centre-left of politics to vote 
to leave the EU as well” (Yeovil 06/09/2015) 
 
Repetitions help to set the crucial ideas in the public’s thinking, but they also highlight the 
leading themes favourite to the speaker. The frequency of words is an ordinary characteristic 
of Farage’s speeches that sometimes bring to a sort of chant (Pierini, 2016: 280). As 
expressions of ideologies, discourses shape individual and collective consciousness, and 
awareness persuades people’s processes. That is, through the repetition of concepts and 
assertions, discourse solidifies knowledge (Jäger & Maier, 2009) and manifests, forms and 
facilitates social reality. In addition, repetition of the pronoun we as in “we can win this 
Referendum”, “we don’t want to stay members of the European Union” or “we can manage 
our borders”, can be considered as calculated manipulation determined to coax any free and 
proud British into conveying and demonstrating a sense of self-respect and patriotism. 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1.3 Number game and Epistemic Modality 
 
 
 
 
Number game is one of the measures that intend to underscore objectivity, hence 
enhancing credibility (Hart & Lukes, 2007: 103). Following van Dijk (2000: 75), numbers 
represent the fact against mere opinions and impressions. Numbers, as we can observe in 
figures like “that passport is now held by 485 million people”, are utilised with the precise 
aim to achieve a more powerful impact in politically experienced catchphrases. For Bos et al. 
(2011), instead, number strategy refers to how well-informed a politician is about the political 
topic discussed. In theory, voters base their electoral choice on solid grounds such in“400,000 
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 net  per  year  or  even  half  a  million”,  although  how  quantitative  evidence  will  turn  out 
 
convincing is still a limited component for a successful persuasion: 
 
15)“Even more money will be saved by scrapping EU red tape on business, which cost £106 billion in 2008 
and will cost £356 billion by 2018 (according to a 2009 estimate from Open Europe). “ (UKIP 2010 Manifesto) 
 
16)“The 2008 Climate Change Act costs an estimated £18bn per year – that’s more than £500 for every 
household in the UK. We will scrap this Act…” (Euro Manifesto 2014) 
 
17)“Raise the threshold for paying 40 per cent income tax to £55,000 and introduce a new intermediate tax 
rate of 30 per cent on incomes ranging between £43,500 and £55,000.” (2015 General Election Manifesto) 
 
18) “Home Office figures up to 2013 show us that in the previous ten year period there were 240,000 
main applicants, not including dependents. Of those, 83,000 were granted asylum or given some form of 
 
humanitarian protection.” (Breitbart 07/08/2015) 
 
 
19)”And that passport is now held by 485 million people and anyone of them, at any time, has the ability and 
free access to come to our country” (Swansea 23/10/2015)20)“The ONS figures assume that from 2020 onwards 
net migration per year will be running at 185,000. That seems awfully low given the current level we are 
running at is 330,000 per year.” (Express 30/10/2015) 
 
21)“… net migration would be (high probability) even higher, perhaps up to 400,000 net per year or even 
half a million each year.” (Express 21/06/2016) 
 
 
Discourse on immigration in the UK, as in most part of Western Europe, is characterized by an 
increasing politicization of immigration as we can infer from all those number reports. The term 
“politicization” (Colombo, 2013: 170) is taken to mean the steady rise in importance of the 
immigration question, until it becomes a central part of the political agenda (Krzyzanowski & Wodak, 
2009). 
 
For what concerns the definition of epistemic modality, we are referring to a modal verb 
adopted to express the speaker’s opinion about a statement. Epistemic modality concerns the 
class of knowledge the speaker or writer has about what he is saying or writing. It deals in fact 
with what the speaker or writer is aware about the world. Besides, it entails that the speaker 
evaluates the probability that the proposition is true in terms of the modal certainty, 
probability or possibility (Downing & Locke, 1992: 332). Seven modal auxiliary verbs are 
generally employed to communicate epistemic modalising meanings: can, could, may, might, 
need, will, would (Garzone, 2001: 169). Specifically, epistemic modality expresses prediction 
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 (e.g. will, would) and/or probability if considered what Farage states in example number 7, 
that is “net migration would be even higher”. Within CDA, modality is retained to affect the 
writer’s (or speaker’s) approach towards and/or certainty in the proposition being presented. 
In sum, the future events referred to were in UKIP former leader’s rhetoric definitely likely to 
happen. 
 
 
4.1.4 Deontic Modality and Negative Politeness 
 
As UKIP’s spokesperson and charismatic leader, Farage proposed policy actions that are 
considered indispensable to accomplish this Europe-free desired world through linguistic 
expressions of deontic modality indicating degrees of essentiality, attractiveness, and 
immediate necessity of proposed policies and change. Deontic language consists in a semantic 
category that illustrates “the degree to which an assessor […] can commit him- or herself to 
the state of affairs in terms of certain principles” (Nuyts et al. 2010: 17). In addition, deontic 
phrases often indicate some kind of process apropos that ideal. According to the approach 
followed by Palmer, deontic modality is involved “with the expression by the speaker of his 
attitude towards possible actions by himself and others” (1986: 121). 
 
The exaggerated description of the highly deontic auxiliary verbs - such as ‘must’ - is 
notably interesting for the intention of party positioning as they reveal degrees of attractive 
quality and necessity: 
 
22) “The only way for Britain is UKIP’ s  way: we must leave.” (2005 G.E. Manifesto) 
 
23) “Religious school materials must not teach hatred of the western world and must be congruent with 
British values. Sharia courts must not override UK law.” (2010 G.E. Manifesto) 
 
24) “We do not have to be members of the EU in order to trade with the EU, or any other country.” (2015 
G.E. Manifesto) 
 
25) “…but what I do see as an issue is that we must absolutely make sure that we do nothing to encourage 
people to seek refugee’s states in this country who come from Mediterranean.” (Yeovil 06/09/2015) 
 
26) “If you want to do those things then you have to say NO to European Union, take back control of our 
country, take back control of our borders and perhaps get back some of our pride and self-respect that those 
generations who went before us had.” (Gateshead 12/10/2015) 
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 27)” I firmly believe the EU should follow the example of Australia which, in 2008, made it clear that 
migrants arriving by boats would not make Australia their home.” ( Dailymail 28/06/2015) 
 
28) “These measures are utterly disproportionate and wrong. And George Eustice, our minister in charge 
of Fisheries, should hang his head in shame for not standing up to the Brussels bullies.” (Breitbart 28/12/2015) 
 
For what concerns the connection between speech acts and politeness Leech (1999: 117) 
chooses to call Searle’s ‘directive’ acts ‘impositive’, with the purpose to define the 
‘competitive’ nature of these illocutions. ‘Negative politeness’ describes this competitive 
class of acts, whose most explicit linguistic phenomenon is constituted by the imperative 
mood. Its use entails the absence of alternative for the listener/reader apart that to obey. 
According to Larreya (2004: 743), the use of ‘must’ – deontically modalized future - is 
specifically present in very formal registers such as political speeches (e.g. “that we must 
absolutely make sure that we do nothing to encourage people to seek refugee’s states in this 
country”). He suggests furthermore that the high frequency of ‘must’ in political discourse, in 
particular construction types and other formal registers reflects a particular formula of the 
genre, which we can see in certain pragmatic effects. 
 
Moreover, in the reported examples from the General Election’s manifestos and speeches, 
it is interesting to notice that besides the adoption of the inclusive ‘we’ in “we do not have to 
be members of the EU in order to trade with the EU” and “If you want to do those things then 
you have to say NO to European Union”, Farage relies on his politeness plan of ‘including’ 
the audience in an act of justice on the actual necessity ordered by an extrinsic authority – 
which is Farage itself in this case - that the modal ‘have to‘ expresses. As a result, the 
audience is recognised as able to decide for themselves on the same page of the speaker’s 
political doctrine. On a general point of view, contemporary UKIP politeness strategy has 
always signified appearing moderate and boosting the interlocutor’s negative reaction against 
their common enemy. What it comes out is that the mitigation of the directive illocutionary 
force relying on the use of modal such as ‘should’ (see the last two examples from editorials 
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 reported) can be attributed to the deontic significance of the modal: it communicates moral 
obligation (advice), resulting in being less peremptory than ‘must’. 
 
 
4.1.5 Blends: Proximization Theory 
 
ODC’S Inevitably Fast Growth ; Construction of threat listing specific consequences 
 
 
The performance of crisis, essence of any potentially menacing implications, is a 
compelling strategy in political debate. Farage indeed linked together a number of recognised 
failures as symptoms attributed to a “crumbling” and “failed” EU such as a reckless 
immigration policy of migrants from Northern Africa, inadequacy of British independence in 
global trade negotiations, the “destruction of British liberty and freedom” by adopting 
European human rights. (Bossetta, 2014. 4). The first two of the main features of the 
Proximization Theory concentrates on the main principles of fear project construction through 
language: 
 
29)”But perhaps one of the consequences of our being part of the European Union that maybe will dominate 
this referendum more than any other is the consequence of us now having a total open border to nearly half a 
million people” (Swansea 23/10/2015) 
 
30)”A future inside the European Union would mean our population rising ever faster at a completely out of 
control and irresponsible rate.” (Express 21/06/2016) 
 
 
Discourse Space Theory is de facto absorbed within Proximization Theory: it consists in 
linguistic references to evoke closeness of the external threat to ask for consent (Cap, 2013: 
294). Sometimes these quotations stimulate a mental threat where ODC crosses the space to 
invade the IDC. As a consequence, Discourse Space peripheral entities (economic migrants) 
are predicted to physically unify upon the Discourse Space central entities (speaker, 
addressees). 
 
 
4.1.6 Exaggeration, Dramatisation, Dystopia 
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 It is frequent politicians intentionally adopt stratagems like exaggeration to emphasise 
 
certain concepts and to intensify eloquence when rhetorically predicting dystopian situations: 
 
 
31)”If we Remain our country will never be the same again. Our public services will be pushed to the 
 
point of failure and our national security will be greatly weakened as EU open borders expand further still.” 
 
Albertazzi (2007: 335) defines “dramatisation” the “need to generate tension in order to 
 
build  up  support  for  the  party  (…)  by  denouncing  the  tragedies  that  would  befall  the 
 
community if it were to be deprived of its defences”. With a Remain outcome the country 
 
“will never be the same again” since social Welfare “will be pushed to the point of failure” 
 
(we could also reconnect to the prediction in epistemic modality). Farage of course refers to a 
 
(perceived) crisis to build up a dystopian narrative in case of an IN victory in the referendum. 
 
It appears clearly stated in example n.11 that the polarization implied by the former UKIP 
 
frontman preferably affects sub-categories of outgroups (the EU in this case) in order not to 
 
directly blame human beings but rather elites wicked immigration policies. 
 
 
 
 
4.1.7 UKIP Narrative and Dystopic Consequences of a Remain Future 
 
The performance of crisis, root of any potentially threatening implications, is an effective 
plan in political debate. As a matter of fact, Farage linked together a number of perceived 
failures as symptoms attributed to a “crumbling” and “failed” EU such as an irresponsible 
immigration policy of migrants from Northern Africa, a scarcity of British independence in 
global trade negotiations, the “destruction of British liberty and freedom” by adopting 
European human rights. (Bossetta, 2014: 4). The first two of the main features of the 
Proximization Theory concentrates on the main principles of fear project construction through 
language: 
 
Dystopia (anti-utopia) – ODC’S Inevitably Fast Growth 
 
32) “To Remain would mean not just net migration at the current record high levels, but at 
rates even higher in the future as the likes of Turkey and others become full EU members” 
 
 
 By narrating every single sentence as a future world in agony (hence dystopian), where the 
victory of the Remain side is envisaged as nothing but one with a pessimistic outlook, there 
are in these examples typical highlights of the populist’s policies grip on the country’s social 
and cultural environment (Kurlat-Ares, 2016: 431). 
 
Construction of threat listing specific consequences 
 
A national-populist party pursues an agenda which is firmly opposed to the European 
Union or other institutions of supra-national governance, a depicted situation where countries 
have irretrievably lost control of their domestic power: 
 
33) “With a population of 80 million, open borders with Turkey would be a total disaster for our country” 
 
According to Cap (2013: 208), to specify the effects of a permanence within the Political 
Union concretises the ODC in terms of its verified ability to hit IDC’s territory from all sides, 
even on (apparently) long distances. 
 
 
Verbs in the progressive (spatial) and Dramatisation 
 
34) «Sharing a land border with Syria, Iraq and Iran (referred to Turkey) would be madness» 
 
The presence of verbs in the progressive (sharing) suggest the closeness of the threat (spatial 
and temporal proximization), and the employment of modal auxiliaries (would) pave the way 
gradually for a change from the secure past (states quo ante) to an obscure future. 
 
 
 
Verbs in the progressive (spatial and temporal), number game, outgroup 
 
35) “Security bosses have warned that ISIS are already entering Europe in large numbers” 
 
36) “Net migration now regurarly running at over 300,000 every year” 
 
37) “Invest an extra £12 billion into the NHS; put £5.2 billion more into social care; build a dedicated 
military hospital and abolish hospital parking charges” (2015, G.E Manifesto) 
 
38) «The same Eu that is expecting an influx of an additional one million migrants this year alone, with the 
 
EU’s owns officials warnin an imminent catastrophe” 
 
 
 
77 
 In the list of sentences reported above the ODC has already invaded the IDC, hence the 
emphasis on the emergency situation about net migration. Particularly significant for the 
campaign the game will be the numbers game: this refers to how knowledgeable a politician is 
about the political topic discussed. Theoretically, voters base their electoral preference on 
substantial grounds even though whether quantitative evidence could be convincing is still a 
partial element for a successful persuasion. Moreover, clearly stated in the example n.6 is the 
polarization implied by the populist party which also affects sub-categories of outgroups (the 
EU in this case) in order not to directly blame human beings but the wicked immigration 
policies. 
 
39) “British people (US) who are keen to work, but whose lives have been made so much harder by our 
irresponsible political establishment (THEM) who have opened up our borders and have the ability to limit the 
number of those coming from the Eastern Europe.” 
 
40) “We must once again become a self-governing, independent nation that controls our borders.” 
 
 
 
 
In a polarized construction, in-group actors often present themselves as victims. This kind 
 
of  self-pity  linguistically  turns  into  Farage’s  report  of  unwilling  other-directed  subjects 
 
through the use of passive verbal forms to prove how the Others downplay the “good-people” 
 
for self-centered purposes. 
 
 
Diachronic Strategy 
 
In a kind of speech that refers to mostly sceptic and unorganized followers, it is easy to 
find historical flashbacks and a narrative build-up of the current situation, which both engage 
proximization strategies (Cap, 2013: 297): 
 
 
41) “I’ts very good that in 1940 we had politicians with genuine patriotic courage. This time it is not the 
politicians that can save this country but the people, if they have self-confidence and believe in Britain” 
 
In this example, Farage works on a diachronic level: he evokes situation of a remote past 
proximized to underline continuity, thus linking the current policy. Once again, the mark on 
inclusive operation working on polarization of US vs. THEM (as aforementioned) reveals to 
be strong in the framework of national-populist parties. 
 4.1.8 Proximization Theory Analysis 
 
The final part of this chapter dedicated to Farage editorial’s analysis will be based on the 
axiological proximization, or the ideological construction of a clash between Discourse Space 
ICD’s Central Entities – Western Civilization and Discourse Space OCD’s Foreigner – 
Islamic Countries. But before exploring this thorny issue, it is primary to highlight that UKIP 
has been reporting for years about a damaging downgrade to ‘racism’ by mainstream parties 
and lined up media. The MEP certainly complains that immigration has made parts of the 
country appear ‘unrecognisable’ and like ‘a foreign land’ (2014). In particular, he links EU 
adhesion to increased immigration from Islamic countries thus linking its policy of 
Euroscepticism, which usually has less public significance, with the concern of immigration, 
which has a much higher salience among the electorate (Tournier-Sol, 2015: 146): 
 
42) “What about the treatment of our women by refugees and immigrants?” 
 
43) “She (Margot Parker, UKIP’s MEP) rightly went on (straightforward talk) to say that our open door 
policy to people from countries where women are treated as second class citizens had directly led to increase 
in sex assaults.” 
 
 
Abundant pluralization of the effected entities 
 
44) “If we remain in this Union we will be even more vulnerable to terrorism (dystopia) and to the kinds of 
scenes that we saw in Cologne on New Year’s Eve” 
 
 
The crystal clear reference to the Cologne train station’s attacks to the detriment of about 
 
80 women who reported sexual assaults and robbery by Arab men on New Year's Eve and the 
angry reaction to the episode presented a space where ODC overlapped the IDC and the pivot 
of the fear construction built on scaremongering attributed to UKIP and populist parties on a 
wider framework in academics studies. 
 
 
 
 
Central national vs peripheral – international interests 
 
 
 All of the negative events of the last years, according to editorials which constitute only a 
marginal part of a much wider and diversified corpus campaign, are caused by the UK 
permanence within the EU which follows their own aims and goes to damage Britain’s 
sovereignty. The solution and leitmotiv offered by the (former) UKIP leader belongs to a 
direct causation easy for the public to understand: 
 
 
45)“The alternative to all of this is that we vote to Leave, take back control of our democracy and take 
back control of our borders” 
 
46) “We must leave the European Union so that not only can wages increase for British workers but so 
that living standards rather than declining can start going up” 
 
47) “The jobs of British people - and the jobs of the five million Europeans who work here – are 
not dependent on EU membership and will be safe when we leave the EU” 
 
By these last reported examples it comes to light that in right-wing parties, the 
implementation of the notions of a ‘third way’, of an alternative between left and right are 
cautiously adopted to present themselves as the only anti-establishment force in support of the 
volonté générale. 
 
 
 
4.2 Self-Identification in UKIP 
 
 
 
 
Several studies have demonstrated the way of escalation about social taboos against 
publicly declared xenophobic opinions has contributed to an advancement of discursive 
strategies that show negative idea of ‘outsiders’ as tolerable while securing the speaker/writer 
from accuses of racism and chauvinism. First of all, it is primary to put out that UKIP has 
been complaining for years of a prejudicial reductionism to ‘racism’ by media opinion and 
parties: their manifesto has been labelled as a political programme combining anti-political 
establishment populism, a quest to return to the status quo ante (including the priority to 
preserve the national identity), and welfare chauvinist racism and xenophobia. As the 
following selected samples from Gateshead and Bath ‘s transcription, and a Breitbart’s 
editorial, report: 
  
48)“I said to you earlier that those that rubbish us and said we’re anti-European. There was even a former 
Tory Chancellor the other week he was incredibly snobby about us and he said we’re xenophobes. We don’t 
xenophobes! We’re not against anybody but we recognized that immigration into Britain in the 1950’s , and the 
1960’s, and the 1970’s, and the 1980’s, and the 1990’s until Mr. Blair got into power…but for that half a century 
we had as a country an open mind about control migration into Britain.” (Gateshead 12/10/2015 ) 
 
49)“And I am not against, we’re not against a sensible balanced immigration policy. But I wanna win this 
referendum so that we have stopped an open door to half a billion people as so that we can put in place and 
Australian-style point system so we can decide who comes to Britain.”(Bath 18/03/2016) 
 
 
This defence from overplayed accusations employed by political opponents constitute part 
of a peculiar type of biased position that identifies racism with something but compulsory and 
physically violent. A sort of amiss intolerance coming from the out-grouped establishment, 
where political parties and their supporters seek to position themselves as ordinary, normal 
and reasonable (Ashe, 2015: 15). In addition, ‘race talk’ and opposition to immigration has 
been usually considered an undeniable element of extreme right-wing parties, but UKIP could 
be rather defined as a slightly nationalist right-wing movement which succeeded in 
intercepting Northern England’s let down Labour voters for the Leave Victory. 
 
As a matter of fact, populists rhetoric expresses issues in a ‘frank’ method, and Farage’s 
solutions are most of times straightforward so as the discursive practises employed: 
 
50) “For too many years any criticism of immigration numbers or its effects on society have been shut down 
by the loud cry of “racism”. (Breitbart 22/01/2016) 
 
51)“And frankly, to have opened up the doors irresponsibly to countries where the minimum wage is a tenth 
of what it is in this country…you didn’t have to be a rocket scientist did you to work out what was going to 
happen.” (London 20/11/2015) 
 
52)“And frankly I think it was wholly irresponsible of our politicians, of our governments to have allowed 
this to happen.”(Gateshead 12/10/2015) 
 
His speeches can be explained as attention-getting, blunt and highly straightforward, which 
not usually follow the rules of politeness and diplomacy. 
 
4.2.1 Victimization as Self-Representation 
 
In the examples previously reported and analysed it is possible to notice, between lines, 
that when the ‘others’ tend to be depicted under a negative point of view, especially when 
 associated with threats, then the in-group is in turn represented as a victim of this 
‘proximized’ threat. The partial representations encountered in this point of investigation are 
used to ‘delegitimize’ (van Leeuwen & Wodak, 1999) the other’s ideologies and legitimize 
their own stances reflected in the social memory (van Dijk, 2000) of the group. More to the 
point, the speaker/writer tends to alter or deceive the manipulative intention of inclusion and 
exclusion. Such an alteration generates positive or negative beliefs on the part of the 
listeners/readers. 
 
This is exactly what occurs when Farage applies the move of Inversion in order to 
emphasize that it is not the Others  who are discriminated against, but We and Our ‘inside 
deictic-center’ (Cap, 2013: 294): 
 
53)“Our political class over the last few decades have lost confidence in this country, have lost confidence in 
our people, they don’t think we’re good enough to stand on our own two feet, to govern ourselves, to make our 
own laws, to make our own trade deals and to control our borders.” (Basingstoke) 
 
54)“But the real point is this: at that I turned to look at Nick it were no point in the whole of the two hours 
ever turned to look at me and I said to him, I said “The trouble is you don’t think we are good enough, do you?”. 
And I could see I actually cut him to the quick because that’s what it’s all about ladies and gentlemen ever since 
so is the people in Westminster have just not thought this country was good enough, just did not believe we were 
capable of running our own lives without being part of some giant undemocratic European club.” (Belfast 
14/09/2015) 
 
During his public statements, the UKIP leader has often resorted to a deceitful inclusive 
operation as part of a populist strategy where the singular first person pronoun we does not 
refer to Farage and the audience itself, but to the Juggernaut EU and/or the British Parliament 
and their mistaken political choices: 
 
55)“Since 2004, when we’ve mistakenly opened the door to countries that are not long escaping from 
Communism, countries that were incredibly poor, net migration even on the official figures it was running at ten 
times per annum what it did from a Post-War period. And I am not against, we’re not against a sensible balanced 
immigration policy.” 
 
56)“And now we have agreed to send them six billions on a vane promise they would stand the flow that’s 
coming across the Mediterranean every single day. But it get worse than that! What we’ve agreed today in 
Brussels is that they will be by the summer of this year Visa-free access for seventy-seven million Turks to come 
into the European Union.” (Bath 18/03/2016)5757)”But we wanted the relationship with the Europe to be one of 
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 neighbourly coexistence, not one where we signed up to that currency, not one where we surrendered total 
control of our borders and not one where our laws are made somewhere else and where the Supreme Court of our 
land can be overruled by a court in Luxembourg or Strasburg.” (Belfast (14/09/2015) 
 
58)“By restoring British tax sovereignty, which we lost when we signed up to the EU…” (2015 General 
Manifesto) 
 
59) “How can it be right that we have opened up our borders totally and unconditionally to the EU, allowing 
 
anyone with an EU passport to come?”(Mirror19/06/2016) 
 
 
So, when Nigel Farage maintains that “we” have mistakenly opened to door to people who 
were not escaping from Communism anymore, that “we” agreed to send six million billions 
(to Turkey) to contain mass flood because “we” have opened “our” borders unconditionally to 
EU, he is employing the three core-issues of the party altogether: anti-immigration, anti-
establishment and ,of course, anti-EU. 
 
4.3 Threat Construction of a Negative-Other 
 
In this eternal fight which sees lined up the people versus their antagonistic ‘other’, 
according to van Dijk (2000: 222), the overall strategy of most of the so called minority 
political discourse is to emphasize positive properties of us against the rivals. For example, 
polarization of US vs. THEM has been implied by the populist party which also affects sub-
categories of outgroups (the EU in this case) in order not to directly blame human beings but 
weak immigration policies: 
 
60) “So, those arguments but uncontrolled mass immigration I think I made, made well understood but ladies 
and gentlemen this is now all taken a very new, and I’m gonna suggest to you potentially very dangerous risk 
because what we saw in April of last year was Mr. Juncker, the Commission President, announcing that we’re 
going to embark upon a European Union common asylum policy.” (Peterborough 16/03/2016) 
 
61) “Immigration is not about race; it is about space. Immigrants are not the problem; it is the current 
immigration system that is broken.” (2015 G.E.Manifesto) 
 
62) “At the moment, the European Union’s common asylum policy has absolutely no means whatsoever of 
checking anybody’s background and I would say that we must not allow a compassion to imperil our safety.” 
(Yeovil 06(09/2015) 
 
In any event, the very first characteristic affixed to whatever kind of migrants coming to 
the country is in terms of their figures: the exaggeration of prospective uncontrolled migration 
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 threats incoming to the UK from the rest of the world, the so-called scaremongering speech to 
national citizens, the threat construction of metaphors concerning floods of immigrants and 
the tactic to blame the EU and their elites as responsible for insecurity in the European 
mainland, and of course in their own country: 
 
63)”When ISIS say they will use the migrant tide to flood Europe with five hundred thousand of their own 
jihadists I think we’ll better listen. Five hundred thousand may not be realistic but what if it’s five thousand, 
what if it’s five hundred and already, one of the ISIS terrorists’ suspects who committed the first atrocity against 
all the Americans in Tunisia has been seen getting of a boat onto Italian soil.” (Yeovil 06/09/2015) 
 
64)“ISIS have said they will use the migrant tide to flood the European continent with half a million of their 
jihadists. Now, even if that figure is wrong I would suggest even fifty-thousand is too many. Even if only one 
percent of that figure is right, I would suggest five-thousand is too many, I would suggest five-hundred is too 
many. It only took eight to cause that destruction in Paris the other night so we need to be careful.” 
 
65)“To the point is that open door immigration even to those who are not really particularly interested in 
politics or self-government or sovereignty. Every one of us can see how fundamentally society has changed over 
the course of the last twelve years. And who’ve been the winner from this? Well I’ll tell you! It’s been the 
big multinational companies because they now have access to unlimited cheap labour and what that has 
done to the lives of millions of ordinary decent British families, it’s driven down their wages and it’s driven 
down their living standards and for government, for Labour and Conservative they’ve presided over a fall in 
the living standards of ordinary decent taxpaying law-abiding people in this country, is in my view a complete 
and utter disgrace.” 
 
(Peterborough 16/03/2016) 
 
To legitimate actions and policies (only policies for UKIP), the speaker proposes to 
neutralize the negative impact of foreign and antagonistic entities (Cap, 2013: 293). 
Moreover, it is possible to observe, through the samples reported above, the menace outlined 
by the high numbers of immigrants perceived by the population, the sense of loss of national 
identity and, on the other hand, “the competition for the economic and social resources and 
the state investment destined to immigration” (Checa Olmos J.C, & Arjona Garrido, 2013: 
118). 
 
 
4.4 I-n Group Pronouns 
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 As stated in the previous chapter on methodology, the strategic adoption of pronouns, 
address terms and personal mentions merge to further highlight the speakers’ individual 
political ideas and moral positions. In addition, it is important to say that in politics the 
concepts of ideology and identity are closely bound with the use of pronouns. As a matter of 
fact, pronouns can indicate (or hide) community and individuality (Fairclough 2003), or they 
can be employed for ‘self’ or ‘other’ referencing or as a way to divide representations of in-
groups and outgroups (Van Dijk, 2001). The meaning of pronouns is deeply conditioned by 
“the social and political ‘spaces’ within which people and groups are positioned or position 
themselves” (Chilton & Schäffner, 1997). Eventually, third person pronouns can underline 
closeness and/or distance in connection with ‘self’ and ‘other’ referencing and its distance 
from the ‘deictic centre’ – of which “I” and its variations can be defined the centre – of the 
distancing scale (Cap, 2013; Chilton, 2004; Wilson, 1990): 
 
66) I am a party leader that takes Northern Ireland seriously and believes it is a must remain and integral and 
valued part of the United Kingdom (Belfast 14/09/2015) 
 
67) I suspect the reality of all of this is that Britain’s population overall is several million higher than the 
official figures would have us believe (FFB, 13/05/2016) 
 
68) I urge you to vote for us and elect UKIP members to our national parliament (2005 
Manifesto R.Knapman) 
 
69) I regret to say, that my prediction of this mild attempt to make this genuine debate in the General 
Election failed totally (Yeovil 06/09/2015) 
 
70) When I still say that they want to flood our continent with half a million Islamic extremists they 
mean it. 
 
71) They are using a series of threats to make you think that you’re not good enough and we’re not good 
 
enough to survive on our own (Express 07/02/2016) 
 
72) Yet all the old political parties remain firmly committed to the EU. They still pretend that, despite the 
experience of 30 years of ‘negotiating’, it can be shaped in Britain’ s interests. (2005 Manifesto R. Knapman) 
 
73) The current political elite - ‘the LibLabConsensus’ - need to hide this massive surrender of power from 
the voters. They employ tactics such as introducing EU laws as obscure statutory instruments and regularly 
 
deny the reality of who actually runs our country. (2010 Manifesto) 
 
74) They say that the EU is the future, and that we couldn’t survive outside it: but we’re the world’s 6th 
 
largest economy, and while the EU share of world trade is shrinking, our prospects are very good indeed. (2014 
EU Manifesto) 
 
75)Other political parties will promise to control immigration, but while they continue to support the UK’s 
membership of the EU, they are not being honest with the electorate. 
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4.5 Different Outgroup Representations Through Different Rhetorical 
 
Devices 
 
According to scholars such as Sauer (2003), in the analysis of – for instance – a speech we 
can find both an effort to persuade and an effort to transform discursive practices by the UKIP 
leader to offer British people a new way to consider nationalism and populist thinking. That is 
why, in this part, I will be proposing how Farage, as spokesman of this minor party, mixes in 
his language “the paradigm of classical rhetoric and modern political communication” 
(Fairclough, 1996: 286). 
 
Farage asks questions he knows the answers to. Repeated rhetorical questions that 
reproach, inveigh or express grief are classically called erotema
12
 or epiplexis
13
. As instance, 
an adequately structured erotema will guide the audience to the opinion that the speaker needs 
them to come to. Moreover, two or three questions can be strung together in quick series for 
additional effect: 
 
76) This project – yeah I’m sure you’ve seen it, I can’t stand that flag what about you? – this project has 
been funded by the European Union. Yuppie! Isn’t that marvellous? Wales has been the recipient of European 
Union money, ain’t that wonderful?(Swansea 23/10/2015) 
77) Well I ask you: “Do you in the light of what has happened in Paris last week; do you in the light of the 
 
fact they’ve decided to continue the open door to the Mediterranean and the Western Balkans; do you feel safer 
as members of the European Union or do you think like us that is time to say no? To take back control of 
our borders and to make sure that never again do we have unprecedented immigration into Britain without our 
ability to check whether people have criminal records, whether they have traits and skills to bring to this 
country, whether they’re bringing their own medical insurance?” (Basingstoke 16/11/2015) 
 
78 )This referendum is: “Do we wish to be British? Do we wish to govern ourselves? Do we wish to be the 
masters of our own destiny?” (Bath 18/03/2016) 
 
By evoking negative connotation, peculiarity of a fear-driven discourse, the use of emotive 
language in words such as ‘British’, and ‘masters of our destiny’ is deliberately employed to 
touch emotionally the audience’s objective perception of the situation (Castello, 2013: 13). 
 
 
12 New Latin, from Greek, from erōtaein to ask.  
13 Latin reproof, from Ancient Greek to strike at, reprove.  
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 Moreover, the distinct stress on “they” is symptom of how outgroup social actors – migrants – 
and their actions are implicitly put under an umbrella of common concern (unskilled, NHS 
sponger). 
 
In rhetoric, epiplexis consists in an interrogative figure of speech in which questions are 
asked with the purpose of condemning or discrediting rather than to obtaining answers. In a 
broader sense, epiplexis represents a form of verbal fight in which the speaker pursues his 
intent to embarass the opponent by using a specific point of view. In other terms, this 
rhetorical device can be described as a peculiar for of a rhetorical question where a critic or an 
attack is asked as a question: 
 
79)"You have the charisma of a damp rag and the appearance of a low-grade bank clerk. And the question 
that I want to ask […] that we're all going to ask, is: Who are you? I'd never heard of you. Nobody in Europe 
had ever heard of you. I would like to ask you, President: Who voted for you? And what mechanism? Oh, I 
know democracy's not popular with you lot. And what mechanism do the peoples of Europe have to remove 
you? Is this European democracy? Well, I sense, though, that you're competent and capable and dangerous. 
And I have no doubt that it's your intention to be the quiet assassin of European democracy and of the European 
nation states." (Belfast 14/09/2015) 
 
10) Why do you think we have a housing crisis? How on earth can you plan for health provision? How on 
earth can you plan for primary school places if you haven’t got a clue in the next five or ten years how many 
people were actually living in the country? And what about the effect of that? (Gateshead 12/10/2015) 
 
81) “Ask yourself a question ‘Would you buy a used car from this Commission?’…The question that I 
want to ask, the question that we’re gonna ask is ‘Who are you? Who voting for you?” (Basingstoke 
16/10/2015) 
 
As we can see in the two examples above reported, the pronoun “you” is both referred to 
an hypothetical audience (would you buy…) and a different kind of “you” which discloses his 
real purpose: to berate the E.U. president and the process of his selection. 
 
This third and last rhetorical device employed by Farage in his speeches prominently here 
reported is the hypophora. It may be interesting to point out that technically, hypophora is the 
question, while anthyphophora is the answer. Nonetheless, hypophora is commonly adopted 
to indicate both question and answer. The question or questions in a hypophora will 
frequently be used to create a long answer, which is the objective the speaker aspires to make: 
87 
  
82) You give me 20 quid, I give you ten quid back. You tell me how much better off you feel about that deal, 
alright? Because, because that is actually what is going on. We pump in 55 million pounds as a membership fee 
to this club and we get less of half of it back. Much of what comes back comes in the form of agricultural 
support and subsidy. (Belfast 14/09/2015) 
 
83)That is what laughingly is called a British passport. You all got one, but you know what the first two 
words on there are? It says European Union. And that passport is now held by nearly five-hundred million 
people all of whom have the freedom to come to Britain, to work in Britain, to use the social security system in 
 
Britain and frankly, that’s not good enough. (London 20/11/2015) 
 
84) And who’ve been the winner from this? Well I’ll tell you! It’s been the big multinational companies 
because they now have access to unlimited cheap labour and what that has done to the lives of millions of 
ordinary decent British families, it’s driven down their wages and it’s driven down their living standards and for 
government, for Labour and Conservative they’ve presided over a fall in the living standards of ordinary decent 
taxpaying law-abiding people in this country, is in my view a complete and utter disgrace (applause). 
(Peterborough 13/03/2016) 
 
85) What do we wish to achieve from our negotiations with the EU? Our objectives are clear: Firstly, we 
will secure trade agreements with the EU, the 40 nations with trade agreements with the EU and other nations of 
interest to us. As a G7 member, a leading world economy, the fifth largest by GDP, this will be a rapid process in 
most cases. (2015 GE MANIFESTO) 
 
86) How can it be right that we have opened up our borders totally and unconditionally to the EU, 
 
allowing anyone with an EU passport to come? It’s led to a huge migratory flow the likes of which our country 
has never seen before. And though the rich may have benefited from cheaper nannies and chauffeurs, British 
workers have seen their wages fall and their quality of life diminish. (Mirror 19/06/2016) 
 
 
As it is possible to back up in the excerpt from the Mirror tabloid, there is a frequent 
Otherness pictured “in disguise” through apparently an inclusive pronoun as “we”. The 
reference is linked not to the writer and his audience, but actually to the Government and its 
despicable choices, such they are depicted by Farage. Eventually, the rhetorical enhancement 
of these appraisals, express the nature of ideological ingroup/outgroup polarization in 
discourse -see also the social inequality highlighted by “the rich” vs. the “British workers” - 
namely by enhancing ‘Our’ good things and ‘Their’ bad things (van Dijk, 2006: 20). 
 
The question present in the General Election’s Manifesto reveals the inclusive intent to 
engage the readers/potential electors into the changing project: what do we, as citizens of the 
United Kingdom, wish to achieve by leaving the EU? The hypophoric answer turns out to be 
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 a long list of promises guaranteed by the party as typical of a written platform the manifesto 
is. 
 
 
4.6 Islam, Muslims and Racism Ambiguity 
 
As reiterated multiple times in this research work, CDA is characterised as a 
multidisciplinary and multi-methodological approach rather than an isolated practice on its 
own. That being said, in ambiguous circumstances with regard to the presence of 
discrimination (Corny, 2010), it is not uncommon to affirm that a scholar who reaches to 
conclusions where discrimination has (or has not) occurred always constitutes a thorny issue. 
In fact, he/she may state or point out the attitudes and ethnic prejudices of white-group 
speakers in sociopolitical and in specific ethnic stances of politicians, in the plan of actions of 
their agenda and in the creation of the ethnic consensus, in the midst of a large number of 
other methods of the politics of immigration and ethnic affairs. Moreover, in both 
communication involving different cultures and text-and-talk about ethnic (or non-Western) 
minorities, so the majority group speakers, or mainly people in the West, he/she may involve 
in the local production and reproduction of white, Western group supremacy, in conveying 
generalizations and largely in the reproduction of social, cultural, or political dominion. As 
generally recognised, CDA is implicated in unethical issues which examines supremacy group 
of people whom are subjected to discursive inequality. 
 
In this section of the chapter dedicated to corpus analysis, we will notice how a negative 
ideological representation builds stereotypes which cast an unfriendly light upon the Muslim 
community. Animosity towards Islam is indeed employed to legitimize discriminatory 
attitudes against Muslims and their consequent exclusion from mainstream society: 
 
87) And today, today Theresa May, the Home Secretary in the House of Commons in her statement 
responding to these appalling events in Paris said that Isis has nothing to do with Islam. Well, I’m sorry, but 
 
again we have to be frank: every single of one of those killers believe they were doing what they were 
doing in the name of Islam. 
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 88)And I’m afraid there is, we have to be honest and frank about this, and talk about these things without 
being fearful that is a problem with some of the Muslim community in this country. 
 
89) It is deeply worrying that after the Charlie Hebdo attack earlier this year, in Paris, when polled 27% of 
British Muslims expressed some sympathy with the motives that carried out that massacre, 11% of that three 
million said that the people who produced those cartoons of Muhammad actually deserved to be attacked 
 
and amongst the 16 to 24 years old there are about a third of young Muslims in Britain who’ve got very split 
and divided loyalties 
 
90) And we’ve reached the point where we have to admit to ourselves in Britain, in France and much of the 
rest of Europe that mass integration and multicultural division has for now been a failure. 
 
91) But if we’re talking, if we’re talking about the encouragement of different groups within our societies, 
within our communities. If we’re talking about the encouragement of them to be as different as possible and to 
integrate at all then we have a problem 
 
(Basingstoke 16/10/2015) 
 
92)“Sweden has a huge problem with sexual assaults and rapes carried out by young male Muslim 
migrants. 
 
93) It isn’t difficult to recognize the problem that there are tens of thousands of cases of female genital 
mutilation that take place in this country every single year and to date there is no single one prosecution. 18%, 
18% of marriages that now take place, Muslim marriages that now take place, take place completely outside 
English Civil Law, and if it come to divorce the women find themselves with absolutely no rights at all. 
 
(London 20/11/2015) 
 
. 
 
As one could notice, a good amount of examples on this issue comes from a transcripted 
speech held in Basingstoke, in Hampshire, a large town full to the brim with blue-collar 
workers and nostalgic pensioners who had backed the party most (Goodwin & Milazzo, 2015: 
160). At a first sight, it seems that all the stereotypes and popular prejudices about Islam and 
its Muslim Community have been summarized for the left-behind citizens in a “frank” talk 
that is typical of a nat-populist talk. 
 
First of all, there is the assumption that the Paris killers “believe they were doing what they 
were doing in the name of Islam”. It comes out then that Islam is nothing but a religion of 
terror and supporting terrorism. Secondly, the accuse of complicity of British Muslim 
community with Islamic terrorism through a number game as highlighted in “27% of British 
Muslims expressed some sympathy” or “11% of that three million said that the people who 
produced those cartoons of Muhammad actually deserved to be attacked” that cannot be 
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 proved wrong via real fact checking because of the nature of the genre. In closing, attention 
on more general human rights, or precisely against them, is the signature song of the London 
speech, a city disinclined to biases: a narrative made of “Muslim marriages that […] take 
place completely outside English Civil Law” and women who “find themselves with 
absolutely no rights at all”, has the specific intent to convey an image of a religion against the 
human rights which has inhuman rules, against freedom, a religion of tyranny and violence 
against women and their rights. 
 
Since the renowned media in the West occupy the highest step in representation, terrorism 
and Islamic fundamentalism, those examples are representative of the iconographic 
stereotypes most often used by the western media, as well as being rhetorical devices not 
uncommon to find in a right-wing populist discourse.14 
 
Actually, the overarching narrative of the discourse is connected to a "time of political 
change" of which UKIP attempted to be a positive part, but the main exception was primarily 
expressed in its campaign by the menace of Islamic radicalization on the "home front", clearly 
portrayed and recounted with pathos (Pareschi & Albertini, 2016: 20). 
 
It would not be proper to define flat out the nature of the examples as typical of a race talk. 
Anyway, this kind of linguistic indeterminacy (explicit or contradictory) is indicative of 
contemporary forms of racism in a post-civil right era because an explicit, direct form of 
racism would be en mass demonized in a society made of anti-discriminatory social norms 
(Guess, 2006). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14 Mahdizade SM. Media theories. Hamshahri (in Persian); 2012. 
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 Chapter 5 
 
Further remarks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.1 About ‘Us’ and ‘Them’: Farage as the Saint Patron of ‘Losers’ 
 
Kriesi et al. (2006: 922) argue that the processes of expanding economic competition, of 
expanding cultural competition, which is in addition connected to massive immigration of 
non-European groups who are considerably different from European inhabitants, and of 
growing political competition between nation-states and supranational or international 
political actors, generate new groups of ‘winners’ and ‘losers’. This means that the probable 
winners include businesspersons and experienced entrepreneurs in sectors open to 
international competition besides all types of cosmopolitan citizens. The likely losers, on the 
other hand, concern entrepreneurs and efficient employees in traditionally secured areas, and 
unskilled workers and citizens who vigorously identify themselves with their national 
community. 
 
What comes out in the first place from the corpus analysis is that the UKIP campaign, time 
after time focussed on European, National or Referendum goals, shows some interesting 
models. For instance, it distinctly reveals a populist attitude, which is in particular articulated 
in a craving for ‘taking back control’ over Britain’s own sovereignty, laws and of course 
borders. Furthermore, discourses have a strong strategic spirit, echoed in a request for an 
unbiased system where EU juggernaut bureaucrats no longer have an all-encompassing 
influence, but the control will be taken back by the elected people from the UK. The majority 
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 of the quotes disclose nationalist views with a specific interest on the popular will and the 
voice of those who cannot supposedly speak. 
 
Focusing on Nigel Farage’s speeches, they clearly manifest disagreement with political 
order. To begin with, Farage uses spatial dimensions of identity to distinguish between 
“normal, decent people” in the so-called “Little England” and the London district. Farage 
asserts that these decent people are detached from the other mainstream political groups. 
These methods of linking and distinction proceed when Farage claims that UKIP members 
originate from across the political spectrum and from all social classes. They are, indeed, “the 
people”. One aspect that connects people around the country, according to Farage, is 
discontent with the politicians based in Westminster (sometimes renamed “Westmonster” by 
the Eurosceptic politician). The categories of ‘the workers’, the ‘young people’ and the 
‘unemployed’ emphasise the exclusive nature of the people from one point of view, while 
defining actors in favour of whom the ‘Us’ is active in the other one. Indeed, the actions 
attributed in documents to the UKIP are mainly of the reactive-defensive, that means against 
the ruling Conservatives most of the time. 
 
What is important not to forget is that text and talk are here interpreted as discourse in 
written and spoken form each in order, where discourse is employed in its real sense to 
mention to actual examples of language use situated in time and place (Hart, 2008: 124). 
Following Hart & Lukes and one of their instances of analysis according to discourse space 
theory, it is interesting to highlight the two inclusive pronouns “we” and “our” which hint at 
the hearer to place themselves with the speaker at deictic centre of the discourse space. 
Analogously, linguistic structures such as the ethnonym “the native British people” and the 
toponym “Britain” are placed at the deictic centre of the discourse space whereas 
“immigrants” are located at the remote end of the spatial axis. (2009, p. 119) 
 
 
5.2 On Identity and Discourse Space Invasion 
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 According to Wodak (2003, 2007), the extreme-right is increasingly sharp when 
expressing its support for racism. In her opinion, anti-immigration stances are usually justified 
from arguments (topoi) related to job protection, abuse of social benefits or incompatible 
cultures by focusing their attention, for example, on Muslims and the so-called “Islamisation” 
of Europe. Racism and discrimination show themselves on the discursive plan in a way that 
opinions and racist beliefs are produced and re-produced within discourse. So, through 
discourse, discriminatory and exclusive practises are prepared, proclaimed and validated 
(Reisigl & Wodak, 2001: 1). The use of pronouns, particularly first person plural pronouns, 
are necessary to help interpreters to conceptualise identity group as internal. Moreover, the 
plural first person possessive pronoun “we” suggests participation as group members and it 
establishes the referents to which they are referred. In this case, anybody who identifies 
him/herself with the nation, the so-called “British People”. It is possible to find in Farage’s 
speeches how Prime Minister David Cameron is depicted as not only inactive for what 
concerns the defence of national identity against the migration threat, but even as a rival. His 
texts are structured in a way that UKIP issues are perceived as the only ones rational and 
deserving legitimacy about debate on national identity and instability. Strategies of 
argumentation as a whole consist in supporting the idea there is a public space invasion in 
order to imply this invasion is illicit and endorsed by mainstream parties who were supposed 
to fight against this situation, with no regard for residents’ rights. Needless to say those 
residents who are constrained to accept this troubled circumstance are the British citizens. 
 
 
5.2.1 Modality and Ideology: a Short Consideration 
 
Political discourse contains a variety of distinguished features: it is often very attentively 
produced, every slight difference accurately examined, and is conceived for a larger electoral 
constituency than the immediate hearers/listeners. In addition, political communication 
intends to influence with exhortative purposes, it favours rhetorical routines, and above all it 
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 deals largely with unrealized hypothetical future situations. Consequently, the particularly 
high frequency of the modal verb ‘must’ in Farage’s speeches and UKIP manifestos, at a time 
when ‘must’ is declining in an age of political correctness promoted by mainstream and left-
media, is due to discourse-marking uses to “signpost” discourse, and the imperative modal 
verb is employed widely across epistemic (predictive) and logical necessity contexts as well 
as for obligation, with no evident connotations of positive speaker/writer stance, rather the 
opposite (Lewis, 2015: 171). 
 
 
 
5.3 The same ‘Other’ in Different Ways 
 
A conspicuous number of instances reported in the previous section shows how 
multiculturalism has been declared dead by the former UKIP’s leader who, furthermore, 
straightforwardly declares that the experiment of integration is a complete failure (e.g. “we 
have to admit to ourselves […]that mass integration and multicultural division has for now 
been a failure”). What he makes through his multi-genre announcements, as perfect 
incarnation of a strong charismatic nat-populist leader, is persuading the hearers and readers 
to widely accept an image of the migrant as that of a troublesome ‘bloke’ not willing to 
integrate in society. Farage utilizes ethical aspects of identity to discriminate immigrants as 
the ‘other’ who project to take advantage of the British system. He maintains that immigrants 
provoke pressure on public services (e.g. hospitals, school places, accommodation) leading to 
a decrease in wages through unskilled labour. Consequently, migrants have been regarded as 
cultural ‘other’ who have to adapt to the cultural mainstream to integrate. Therefore, 
nationalism is essential to protect the existing nation of ‘real’ British citizens and territorial 
border control. As regards to the latter, a new supplementary factor of the topos of criminality 
is the mention to illegal migrants caught at UK border. Since “The EU’s (them) open borders 
make (us) less safe”, this situation has developed a parallel narrative of ‘the 
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 border’ as a key way of resolving the crisis and the issues concerning current migration into 
Europe. So, the solution seems quite simple and straightforward as distinctive of populist 
discourse : “If you want to do those things then you have to say NO to European Union, take 
back control of our country, take back control of our borders” moreover: “…To take back 
control of our borders and to make sure that never again do we have unprecedented 
immigration into Britain without our ability to check whether people have criminal records”. 
According to Lakoff (2006: 141) direct causation, which means approaching a problem via 
direct action, seems not to be the best option to solve problems. Empirical research has 
pointed out that conservatives – and right-wing political movements – are capable of inferring 
with direct causation, and do not seem to see the considerable difficulties and alarming 
consequences of such actions due to the complexities of systemic causation, which they do 
not take into account. 
 
However, within the discourse elaborated by the party leader, it is possible to deduce at 
least three categories attributed to migrants – contributing to their image as an out-group. As 
stated in 1.2.1, new populism has been favouring the notion of ethnic pluralism when 
addressing to minorities for some time: in the optic of CDA we may say the social power by 
itself may not be negative in the first place, but what in fact is of significance to CDA is the 
inappropriate use of power (Rashidi & Souzandehfar, 2010: 56), which would create 
inequality in the society placing specific concepts cloaked in a veil of suspect: 
 
 
“To state sponsored multiculturalism, by which I mean encouraging division in society actually welcoming 
ghettos growing up in many of our cities and towns, that actually through that process we’ve finished up in many 
parts of the UK today in a bad place.” London (20/11/2015). 
 
 
The debate on these two civilizations in conflict provided relevance to the migrant 
considered as cultural ‘other’, having obsolete values and a different religion (Lutz, 1991; 
Razack, 2004). Referring to Muslim people in Great Britain, Farage maintains that “They 
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 seemed to be ashamed to the fact that we have a Judeo- Christian culture in this country and 
we, and we should actually be saying […] of this defective groups there’s a lot about this 
country that’s great: liberty, freedom, democracy, the presumption of innocence before guilt, 
our right to trial by jury”. As a discursive style, the ex-UKIP leader seems to adopt the typical 
populist political expression based on dichotomies in order to depict Muslim groups by 
actually framing them culturally and religiously fundamentalist, that is a serious threat to 
Westerns culture, religion and justice. As a matter of fact, the representation of the migrant as 
menacing ‘other’, as we can notice in “Sweden has a huge problem with sexual assaults and 
rapes carried out by young male Muslim migrants”, has come to be used notably after 9/11 in 
relation to public security (Haynes, 2007: 13). As pointed out in 5.6 about Muslim marriages 
in the UK, which take place “completely outside the English Civil Law”, patriarchy 
repressing the women is associated with the Arab or Muslim backdrop of the men to whom a 
distorted sexual behaviour is ascribed to. In any case, the opinion that the migrant is a peril to 
public integrity and safety has been proved to gain particular sustain, probably due to the 
multiple terrorist attacks in Europe in recent history. 
 
In the context of a failed multiculturalism discourse not limited to Muslim community, the 
concept of cultural ‘other’ has been strengthened and fomented by the idea of the migrant as 
criminal ‘other’ (Baldacchino & Sammut, 2015) as it is possible to infer in some interesting 
references to the previous favourite ‘scapegoat’ of UKIP anti-immigration’s narrative, 
Romanians : 
 
 
“I recommend they all go and visit Page Hall, a suburb of Sheffield. Over 800 Roma people have 
been moved into the area. The overall state of decline, the rising crime and the closure of local 
businesses has to be seen to be believed.” (Express 27/04/2016) 
 
 
Much more than manifestos, online editorials and public speeches are drafted for ordinary 
party followers who are supposed to recognise the populist language. In the last years, the 
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 political movement has built the image of immigration as an unstoppable force by using, for 
example, repeating water metaphors (e.g. “the migrant tide to flood the European continent”). 
What it comes out from the corpus is, however, that emphasis has moved from Eastern 
European immigration to mass Third World, mostly illegal, flood or invasion. Overall, the 
analysis shows that Farage use language broadly to distinguish between in-groups and out-
groups in quite fine-tuned parameters. 
 
 
 
5.4 Populism and the Reinvention of Nat-Populist Rhetoric 
 
From a rhetorical point of view, the last Referendum Campaign saw the Leave side using 
the fascinations of pathos, while the Remain side invested more on reasoning directed by 
logos. This important distinction built the kind of topics both positions would employ. As for 
example in “the future as the likes of Turkey and others become full EU members” or “open 
borders with Turkey would be a total disaster for our country”, we see that by appealing to 
pathos Farage was able to use fear of immigration and the possible dangers of Turkey entering 
the European Union in order to spread a sense of apprehension for the future. It is important 
not to forget that characters like Boris Johnson and Nigel Farage relied on credibility. They 
constructed a persona that gives the impression to be sympathetic and transparent while 
representing, on the other hand, David Cameron and ‘Remainers’ such as John Major and 
Tony Blair as detached establishment. The precondition that surrounds this rhetorical strategy 
involves persuading the audience (or reader) that their experiences and compentencies echo 
their own. For the ‘distant’ supporters of Remain, cosmopolitan qualities accentuate the 
benefit of open national borders, mutual multicultural qualities, diversity of peoples and 
lifestyles in outward looking and inclusive societies (Inglehart & Norris, 2016: 7). For what 
concerns the Leave case instead, by maintaining that “we’ve (us) actually been betrayed by 
our political class (them)”, Farage claims to understand and sympathise with the voters and 
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 their concerns. Given the higher tendency of the older sections of the voters at ballot box, the 
Leave side tried to demonstrate the worries of the ‘baby boomer’ era. As a matter of fact, “If 
we Remain our country will never be the same again”, he argued: the EU is an obscure power 
that weakens British identity and the scourge of immigration has swamped the UK with alien 
customs and/or ideas (Crines & Heppell, 2016: 62). 
 
That being said, in this analysis I observed a kind of ‘innocuous’ nationalism far from the 
BNP
15
 violent ideology, in the sense that it affects the feeling of ease in the physical and 
traditional backgrounds of a person’s nation as well as acquiring pride – “about pride in our 
country” - in the positive achievements of one’s nation or of fellow nationals (Cunningham, 
2007). However, this harmless chauvinism seems to be opposite to the idea of 
multiculturalism, and nat-populism within this research study should be considered as 
promoter of the defence of a territorial state as centrally affiliated to one ethnic-cultural body 
and passionately active in protecting and disseminating its principles. 
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 Conclusions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Before the – unexpected – 2016’s Brexit outcome, the concept of protest was on its way of 
becoming a permanent part of the British electoral composition. UKIP has represented such a 
consistent portion of unrepresented public opinion (i.e. the left-behind ‘Little Englanders’) 
that he has remained for a considerable period of time a real challenge to the other parties and 
how they communicate. 
 
This study has investigated the in this research project the ways in which UKIP in general 
and Nigel Farage in particular employed language and their persuasive effect on the audience 
about national populist issues. This macro-theme has been furthermore divided into three 
different subthemes: resentment against the subordination of the UK to EU (symbolized by 
Brussels bureaucrats), resentment against economic migration, and the third essential reason 
and theme of hostility, that is to say against the internal political establishment. What comes 
out, amongst other things, is how encouraging people to have the audacity to bid for freedom 
calls for more flowery language, impressive metaphors and a stirring partisan spirit than a 
supported by government campaign (such as the Remain campaign) which simply affirms that 
the maintenance of the status quo is simply the best option to choose. 
 
As stated repeatedly in the course of this study, the object of Critical Discourse Analysis is 
to reveal the ideological inferences that are covered in the worlds of a written 
manifesto/editorial or oral speech. Consequently, with CDA as methodology, this type of 
political discourse has been analysed to determine what are the peculiarities appearing in the 
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 discourse, and how those peculiarities are important for the re-construction of the idea of the 
migrant as the ‘Other’. An interesting issue is, for example, how analysis essentially shows 
that the event of leaving in Brexit-related productions is presented as a promise while the 
event of remaining is presented as a danger. This is based on an intertextual connection to the 
Leave campaign’s leitmotiv ‘We want our country back’. The slogan has the power to attract 
voters who would have an interest on certain arguments like immigration to be contained and 
generally recalls the aversion for the concept of supra-nationalism in the EU, under which 
Britain loses all its ‘proverbial’ sovereignty. 
 
A separate mention should be made for the notion of ‘independence’, which is worth of a 
separate treatment. As a matter of fact from a campaign perspective ‘independence’ is, of 
course, a powerful word highly touted by the United Kingdom “Independence” Party itself, 
and a word strictly twisted together with the deep principle of democracy. Claiming indeed 
the UK needs to restore its independence not only makes the ‘Leave’ crusade to look more 
attractive, but it further emphasises the negative features attributed to the EU and makes EU 
authority seem notably inequitable and dictatorial. Moreover, nominating the Referendum day 
“Independence Day” lends it the status of a historic moment and produces a profound 
symbolic connotation to the vote in the face of the British people and British glorious history 
of their fathers. For that reason, the verbal struggle for independence acquires the implication 
of constituting a noble cause of courage and integrity. 
 
Against this backdrop, the idea of Nation in Farage and UKIP is delineated by the respect 
towards old British Empire. However, the multi-genre discourses here analysed do not seem 
to contain a real racial ideology. From a certain point of view, it would be proper to 
distinguish the term ‘prejudice’ from ‘racism’ since the last one is a sort of ‘prejudice plus 
power’. And prejudice, with the lack of political or economic support, would be unable to 
spread as a phenomenon related to culture, institution and society in an extensive way. The 
corpus investigated shows UKIP’s most charismatic leader Nigel Farage presenting himself as 
101 
 a ‘reasonable’ figure, always communicating arguments without never crossing the ‘border’ 
of extremism, constantly relying on common sense. Given the above, UKIP and Farage’s 
communication style has no distinguishable racial theory in their narrative. It follows that 
their anti-immigration stance is more connected to the economic issue, which is found within 
conservative political doctrines whose position have always been well-tied to Nationalism, 
that means that such discourses are familiar with construction tropes of fear mongering and 
scapegoating by choosing the subject of the day. 
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